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1
I am pleased to provide you the 56th edition of the ESAR­
DA Bulletin, containing papers related to encapsulation 
plants and geological repositories presented at the ESAR­
DA Working Group meetings in Ispra in November 2017. 
Some the papers were already selected by the chairper­
sons of the 49th ESARDA Symposium, held in Dusseldorf 
on May 2017, that, for editorial reasons, were not pub­
lished in earlier issues. As discussed with the Editorial 
Committee, the aim was to produce a thematic issue on 
the different aspects related to the geologic disposal of 
spent nuclear fuel. This also a reflection to the feedback of 
the member survey carried out during the winter 2017­
2018 by the ESARDA Reflection Group.
As the past Chair of the Verification Technologies and 
Methodologies (VTM) Working Group (WG) I have been 
pleased to experience interactive participation in the joint 
meetings with the Implementation Safeguards (IS), Con­
tainment and Surveillance (C/S) and Non­destructive As­
say (NDA) WGs during the last years in Ispra November 
meetings. The non­destructive verification of spent nuclear 
fuel prior to the encapsulation has been one of the main 
topics the NDA WG. I am grateful to the presenters for 
their work to produce scientific articles for the ESARDA 
Bulletin. All articles were re viewed by at least two inde­
pendent expert reviewers, guaranteeing the high standard 
of the publication.
On behalf of ESARDA, I would like raise the status of our 
Bulletin. The periodic issuance depends on the members’ 
activeness. The symposium papers give basic for new arti­
cles, but in order to catch all advances in our multi­discipli­
nary field of safeguards, I encourage you to submit contri­
butions to the Bulletin at any time so that all the ESARDA 
community can bene fit from the latest progress and 
achievements in safeguards research and development. 
Authors are kindly requested to follow the formatting in­
structions available on the ESARDA website.
I am very pleased to remind you of the following ESARDA 
events coming in 2018­2019:
• Some of the Working Group meetings will be arranged 
already in connection with the IAEA Safeguards Sympo­
sium in Vienna in early November 2018.
• ESARDA will celebrate its 50 years anniversary during the 
ESARDA Symposium in Stresa (Italy) on 13–16 May 2019.
Detailed infor mation will be posted on the ESARDA 
website.
Regarding the ESARDA website and the new LinkedIn ES­
ARDA profile, I would like to address sincere thanks to An­
drea De Luca, webmaster and essential assistant for the 
ESAR DA Bulletin preparation, and to Elena Stringa, the 
Bulletin Editor, for arranging the timely review process. 
Thank you very much for your en gagement during the 
preparation of this thematic issue.
I wish you all a successful, fruitful and relaxing summer 
2018.
Editorial
O. Okko
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GOSSER - Geological Safeguards and Security R&D 
Project in Finland - How STUK prepares itself for the 
Final Disposal in Finland
O. Okko, M. Moring, T. Honkamaa, E. Martikka, M. Hämäläinen
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority
STUK, Finland
The licensed construction of the disposal facility in 
Finland begun in autumn 2016 as the foundation works 
for the encapsulation plant and the excavations of the 
access tunnels to the canister shaft and canister storages 
in the geological repository were initiated. The disposal of 
spent nuclear fuel is scheduled to start in Finland in mid 
2020’s after the operational l icence is granted. To 
ascertain that necessary technical safeguards tools are 
available at that time, STUK, the Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority of Finland has set up a national R&D 
project GOSSER (Geological Disposal Safeguards and 
Secur i ty R&D). GOSSER’s main objective is the 
f ina l isat ion of the nat ional F innish concept for 
safeguarding the final disposal of the spent nuclear fuel. 
This concept and related R&D efforts are coordinated 
with the Finnish facilities, European Commission and the 
IAEA. Activities in GOSSER include so far: 1) Participation 
in R&D of robust, reliable, and accurate methods to verify 
spent nuclear fuel prior to final disposal. The work has 
been done in cooperation with Helsinki Institute of 
Physics, the IAEA and other international partners. 2) 
Participation in the Safeguards-by-Design process of the 
Finnish encapsulation plant and final repository and, 
when necessa r y,  deve lopment  o f  sa feguards 
methodologies for attaining knowledge of the verified 
nuclear material and to maintain it for future generations.
Keywords: Spent Nuclear Fuel; Safeguards; IAEA; Geo­
logical Disposal; Final Disposal; Safeguards­by­Design
1. Introduction
In November 2015 the Finnish Government granted the li­
cence to construct the disposal facility consisting of the 
encapsulation plant (EP) and the geological repository 
(GR). The operator (Posiva), Finnish State Regulatory Au­
thority (STUK), IAEA and the European Commission are 
cooperating on developing safeguards measures and on 
designing the necessary safeguards infrastructure for 
these facilities. The spent fuel disposed of will not be ac­
cessible for verification using traditional safeguards 
measures. The international and national safeguards 
measures have to create confidence that no nuclear ma­
terial is diverted before, during or after the disposal pro­
cess and that no undeclared nuclear activities take place 
at the disposal facilities. Moreover, the operational phase 
of the facilities will last over a century, thus the safe­
guards­related technological infrastructure should be 
flexible and upgradable. Safeguards by design (SbD) e.g. 
planning the safeguards measures and designing the 
necessary safeguards infrastructure during the design 
phase of the facilities has many benefits. Cost­efficiency 
is assured by including safeguards equipment such as 
cameras, radiation detectors, cables and conduits, into 
the facility design.
A plan for the operator’s safeguards activities during the 
construction and operation of the disposal facility was in­
cluded by the operator in the application for the con­
struction licence. This included the main steps in nuclear 
material accountancy and control during the facility de­
velopment and preliminary plans for the control and ac­
countancy during spent fuel transfers through the encap­
sulation and disposal process. The plan was approved by 
STUK during the licensing process and an assessment 
was included in the STUK Statement [1]. However, in or­
der to ascertain that necessary technical safeguards 
tools are available at the time needed, STUK launched 
the national R&D project GOSSER (Geological Disposal 
Safeguards and Security R&D). The main objective of 
GOSSER is the finalisation of the national Finnish concept 
for safeguarding the final disposal of the spent nuclear 
fuel. This concept and related R&D efforts are coordinat­
ed with the Finnish operators, the European Commission 
and the IAEA.
The key task of GOSSER (named LOVE) is to develop 
a robust, reliable, and accurate method to verify spent 
nuclear fuel prior to final disposal. The IAEA requires that 
spent fuel is verified at a partial defect level before trans­
fer to “difficult to access” locations; however, there is no 
current method available that can reliably detect a diver­
sion of less than 50% of the pins in a fuel element. The 
Finnish Support Programme to the IAEA Safeguards has 
researched the applicability of Passive Gamma Emission 
Tomography (PGET), and it will be the main candidate for 
further investigation. Combined with other methods, like 
gamma spectrometry and neutron measurements, it can 
be used to verify the correctness and completeness of 
the declared fuel at pin level. Another task of GOSSER 
(named JOY) is to evaluate and, when necessary, devel­
op safeguards methodologies for attaining knowledge of 
the verified nuclear material and to maintain it for future 
generations. This task may require different techniques 
from traditional C/S, including geophysics and novel 
technologies, as wel l  as methods from societal 
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verification and long term data management. GOSSER 
will recognise the interfaces between safeguards, securi­
ty and safety [2]. Security and safeguards both share 
a common objective: spent nuclear fuel is secured from 
unlawful actions.
2. Verification of spent fuel prior to disposal
STUK has a regular NDA verification programme. The goal 
of this programme is to verify that information provided by 
the operator is correct and complete, maintain and devel­
op NDA expertise, prepare for final disposal and support 
IAEA safeguards conclusions. STUK performs 1 – 2 meas­
urement campaigns annually at each Finnish NPP site 
Olkiluoto and Loviisa. The traditionally used verification 
tools are SFAT, eFORK and GBUV [3]. Since early 2017 
year also the PGET device is used for verification as well 
as testing [4].
The Finnish Support Programme to the IAEA Safeguards 
has studied the applicability of Passive Gamma Emission 
Tomography (PGET) [5]. Under the GOSSER project, 
a research group was established in 2015 to study and 
develop the PGET method further. The Finnish Funding 
Agency for Innovation (TEKES) provides funding for the 
Finland Distinguished Professor Programme (FiDiPro) at 
the Helsinki Institute of Physics (HIP) for the years 2015 – 
2018. STUK has a guiding role in the work and also ac­
tively participates in method development. The aim is to 
develop a combination of robust, reliable, and accurate 
methods to verify spent nuclear fuel prior to final dispos­
al, down to detecting diversion of single fuel pins. Be­
cause the IAEA and GOSSER project share the same 
main goal, to develop functional apparatus for partial de­
fect level spent fuel verification, the LOVE project can 
provide in­kind support to the work conducted under 
IAEA MSSP tasks. This will include, for instance, arrang­
ing test campaigns with the NPPs.
The latest tests with the prototype have shown the appli­
cability of the method. Combined with other methods, 
like gamma spectroscopy and neutron measurements, it 
can provide precise and accurate verification results. The 
first campaigns with the upgraded PGET in Finland took 
place in February 2017 in Loviisa and in April in Olkiluoto. 
The campaigns went very well. The deployment of the 
system was easy (see Fig. 1) and the PGET demonstrat­
ed its ability to reconstruct and analyse images of various 
fuel types with relatively short acquisition times (about 
5 min). Missing pins were detected with good confidence. 
Examples from these measurements are presented in 
Figure 2. The progress is reported also in the MSSP task 
report [6]. It is also foreseen that the PGEG will be au­
thorised for spent fuel verification measurements. Al­
though the technology has been developed and demon­
strated, some research is still needed to support system 
development.
Figure 1. The PGET in spent fuel pool.
Figure 2. Examples from PGET measurements [5].
3.  Safeguards-by-Design process
In addition to the NDA measurements several other safe­
guards practices and measures are to be developed and 
implemented with the facility design, construction and 
commissioning. The safeguards equipment infrastructure 
to be installed in the Olkiluoto encapsulation plant is al­
ready developed in cooperation between the stakeholders, 
IAEA, European Commission, STUK and the operator [7]. 
However, the design of the facility is still being optimised 
by the operator. Continuous communication between the 
stakeholders is essential to assure that the operator main­
tains safeguardability of the facility and that the inspector­
ates are able to modify their equipment infrastructure ac­
cording to changes in plant design. A similar process is 
foreseen to be conducted for geological repository during 
the initial planning and construction phase. Geological in­
vestigations and construction of the geological repository 
will continue in parallel through its operational period. Due 
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Figure 3. Layout of the disposal facility at Olkiluoto.
to unforeseen elements in the geology and rock mechan­
ics, the repository layout at Olkiluoto cannot be rigidly 
planned in advance, so any safeguards measures in the 
repository needs to have enough flexibility to adapt to de­
sign changes. The current layout of the facility is shown in 
Figure 3. The basic technical characteristics (BTC) and the 
site declaration are to be updated when major changes 
are introduced in the design process.
The operator presented its plan to control the integrity of 
the fuel canisters and to demonstrate and to document 
their safe transfer to the emplacement hole with their con­
struction licence application. This plan was approved by 
STUK in 2015 with the remark that the operator has to facil­
itate safeguards measures by STUK, the EC and the IAEA 
with the progress of the project. Currently, the material ac­
countancy for fuel canisters is a part of the negotiations of 
the Facility Attachment to be agreed between the IAEA and 
the EC. Both STUK and the operator are consulted from 
the beginning of this iterative process. Also, the ultrasonic 
identification of the canisters is under method develop­
ment [8]. In the disposal process, the Continuity­of­Knowl­
edge and supporting Containment and Surveillance meas­
ures will be essential; whereas the annual physical 
inventory verification (PIV) of the underground repository 
cannot be carried out in a traditional manner. The Safe­
guards­by­Design process will cover also these aspects.
In order to detect undeclared activities, STUK has direct 
access to and, in cooperation with safety, also de facto full 
time institutional presence at the active final disposal facili­
ty site. In the national concept development this asset will 
be utilised. Currently the Olkiluoto monitoring programme 
was reassessed in [9]. and a few recommendations were 
suggested to have more safeguards use of the operators 
data and safety assessment. STUK follows the daily re­
search and work plans, and the continuous monitoring of 
the site as safety assessment of a geological repository is 
of international research interest with also societal and 
safeguards aspects e.g. [10]. STUK has also contacts to 
other authorities in Finland that are e.g. licensing construc­
tion activities and therefore can report about any unde­
clared safeguards­relevant activities. In contrast to this, the 
international safeguards inspectorates lack these capabili­
ties, therefore, they have to employ technological solu­
tions, which STUK has less need for that. STUK however 
must be aware of the capabilities and properties of these 
techniques. As the GOSSER project is based on external 
cooperation, STUK does not need to perform its own re­
search for this purpose. It is sufficient to follow what other 
institutions are developing in Finland and abroad for the 
safety assessment and security precautions and to dem­
onstrate this to the inspectorates.
4. Summary
The GOSSER project was launched because safeguards for 
spent fuel disposal is a new challenge and new concepts 
need to be developed and implemented already during the 
early design and construction of the final disposal facility li­
censed in 2015. The time span of the overall disposal pro­
ject is more than100 years so process optimisation has high 
pay off opportunities. As the disposal facility is of a new kind 
to be safeguarded, the methods developed and applied in 
Finland have to gain international acceptance.
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The disposal of spent fuel requires that safety, information 
security and other security arrangements and the safe­
guards required to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weap­
ons are properly implemented. This requires the reconcilia­
tion of all areas resulting in the implementation of 3S in an 
appropriate manner. This, in turn, requires action from the 
operators producing, encapsulating or disposing of spent 
nuclear fuel as well as the authorities (STUK). Although, the 
European Commission and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) have strong roles in the safeguarding of nu­
clear materials they are not directly in the focus of this pro­
ject, however, they will benefit from its developments.
The novelty of the disposal concept calls for adequate re­
search and provides the reasoning for establishment of 
GOSSER R&D project. If GOSSER is not successful, in the 
worst case there is a risk that the credibility of the disposal 
concept is questioned and; moreover, the future genera­
tions may not have adequate information to satisfy them­
selves that the spent fuel is fully and reliably disposed of in 
the repository. The main objective of GOSSER is the finali­
sation of the Finnish concept for safeguarding the disposal 
of the spent nuclear fuel by 2018.
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Non-destructive assay sampling of nuclear fuel before 
encapsulation
C. Hellesen and S. Grape
Division of Applied Nuclear Physics, Department of Physics and Astronomy, Uppsala University, Box 516, 751 20 Uppsala, Sweden
E­mail: carl.hellesen@physics.uu.se, sophie.grape@physics.uu.se
Abstract:
Swedish spent nuclear fuel is planned to be verified before 
being encapsulated and placed in a geological repository 
500 meters below ground in the bedrock. Verification 
before encapsulation is intended to ensure both the safe 
storage of the spent fuel, and that Sweden is honoring its 
international obligations according to the NPT, international 
treaties and bilateral agreements on the topic of nuclear 
safeguards.
The measurements will mark the last chance of verifying 
the spent fuel, as there are no plans to retrieve them once 
they enter the geological repository. With respect to 
nuclear safeguards, fuel assemblies will likely be verified 
for both gross defects and partial defects, whereby 
a  fraction of the fuel content has been removed or 
replaced. A conclusion also needs to be made on the 
correctness of the fuel assembly declarations, translating 
into a verification (or determination) of the fuel parameters 
such as initial enrichment, burnup and cooling time.
Keywords: non­destructive assay; spent nuclear fuel; 
sampling; encapsulation
1. Introduction
Sweden is a country with a substantial fraction of electrici­
ty being produced by nuclear power. The spent nuclear 
fuel is currently stored in the Swedish Interim Storage Fa­
cility for Spent Nuclear Fuel (Clab) in Oskarshamn. The 
proposed future encapsulation facility Clink will be built 
next to Clab, and it is planned that the fuel will be meas­
ured here before being encapsulated and shipped to the 
geological repository in Forsmark. This repository will be 
a so­called “difficult­to­access storage” since the fuels are 
not easily retrievable. This means that spent fuel assem­
blies that can be dismantled should be verified with a par­
tial defect test or, if not available, the best available method 
approved for inspection use; spent fuel assemblies that 
are difficult to dismantle (e.g., welded fuel assemblies) 
should be verified with at least a gross defect test. The 
reason is that spent nuclear fuel contains up to 1% of plu­
tonium, which is a nuclear­weapons usable material.
There is a need to develop a sampling plan for the spent 
nuclear fuels. This sampling plan needs to include suffi­
ciently many fuels in the fuel inventory in a partial defect 
test to ensure that the probability to discover a missing 
specified quantity is at least 90% or greater [1]. Often, 
a specified quantity is equal to a significant quantity (SQ), 
which for plutonium is 8 kg [2]. This means that in total, the 
false­negative rate of a  diversion of 1  SQ should be 
below 10%.
The measurements will be non­destructive, possibly in­
cluding several measurement techniques in one location. 
According to the IAEA, the measurements will take place 
in “the assembly handling cell” [3] before placing the fuels 
in the copper canister. It is not clear at this stage what this 
location corresponds to; possibly it could mean the fuel 
handling pool at the upcoming Clink facility, but not neces­
sarily. If we assume that the measurements will take place 
under wet conditions, measurements could be performed 
on the pool side, in a dedicated measurement room next 
to the pool via collimators, inside the pool or at fuel racks 
or integrated into the fuel handling equipment [4].
Although this context is inspired by Sweden, the situation 
is similar to that of many other countries. The IAEA require­
ments are the same everywhere, and it is likely that the im­
plementation of nuclear safeguards verification in a pio­
neering country becomes the standard, or at least a guide, 
for other countries.
2.  Experimental verification challenges before 
encapsulation
There are several open questions remaining with respect 
to the nuclear safeguards verification, and specifically with 
relevance to the sampling plan. Having said that, we here 
consider that not all fuels will be measured with the same 
accuracy (given that instrument accuracies are expected 
to improve over time), and that some kind of random sam­
pling will be performed. Examples of relevant questions in 
this context are:
• What exactly needs to be measured?
• What level of defects need to be verified with which 
confidence?
• What accuracies and uncertainties are associat­
ed with the considered measurement techniques or 
instruments?
A spent nuclear fuel typically contains up to 1% plutonium, 
which is particularly sensitive as it can be used as raw ma­
terial in a nuclear explosive device (NED). It is classified by 
IAEA as a direct use material [2]. This is in contrast to the 
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uranium in the fuel, which is low enriched (LEU) and can­
not be used in a NED without subsequent enrichment. 
LEU, like irradiated nuclear fuel, is classified by IAEA as in­
direct use nuclear material. Since plutonium can be chem­
ically separated from other elements in the fuel it is vital 
that the spent fuel is accounted for.
For all weapons usable materials, a significant quantity 
(SQ) is defined as the approximate mass for which the 
construction of a NED cannot be excluded. For plutonium 
this is 8 kg [2]. This means that a PWR assembly, with 
a weight of about 600 kg, contains up to 6 kg plutonium. If 
a larger fraction than 2 3/  of the fuel rods in two separate as­
semblies are diverted and replaced with dummy rods of 
equal mass, it could make up one SQ of plutonium. Fur­
thermore, if smaller fractions are diverted from a, potential­
ly large, number of fuel assemblies, one significant quanti­
ty of plutonium can be accumulated over time, a scenario 
known as roll­up [5]. To exclude the risk of a roll­up sce­
nario in an encapsulation plant, where on the order of 100 
000 assemblies will be encapsulated, will obviously be 
a challenge. It is important that the fuel assemblies are 
tested for defects at different levels prior to encapsulation. 
In this paper we consider diversions from 50% of an as­
sembly down to single pin level.
Within nuclear safeguards, it is important to assure that 
a significant quantity of weapons usable material is not di­
verted. The diversion can take many shapes. If we consid­
er 17 by 17 PWR assemblies, each rod contains about 
20 grams of plutonium. Acquiring a total of one SQ would 
require the removal of one single pin from 400 PWR differ­
ent assemblies. It can be argued that it is sufficient for nu­
clear safeguards inspectors to detect one single diversion 
attempt before the series of diversions have accumulated 
to a total of one SQ, rather than necessarily detecting 400 
cases of partial defects on the single rod level. A positive 
outcome in a random sample could then initiate sampling 
on a more detailed level of a larger number of assemblies 
to investigate the possibility of an actual diversion attempt 
(as opposed to a mistake, such as a wrongly declared 
assembly).
A sampling protocol would have to be established. Course 
measurement techniques, capable of detecting diversions 
involving a large fraction of missing fuel pins, would need 
to be used more frequently. Very accurate techniques, ca­
pable of detecting diversions of small fractions of missing 
pins, could be used less frequently.
There are a limited number of instruments currently au­
thorized for partial defect testing on the 50% level by the 
IAEA: the Digital Cherenkov Viewing Device (DCVD) [6] and 
the Fork detector (FDET). In addition, the passive gamma 
emission tomography (PGET) system [7] has also recently 
been authorized for genuine partial defect verification, 
meaning verification on the single pin level. Work on 
improving these techniques, as well as the development of 
new ones, is ongoing. See for example [8].
3. Methodology
In this work we have studied the defect verification of a fuel 
inventory intended for encapsulation with a Monte Carlo 
based sampling approach. Two types of simulations have 
been used.
In the first type, the sampling is tested at three levels of de­
fects, 50%, 10% and single pin. The defect level is here re­
ferred to as fdefect. In the first case, 50% of the rods, in 
a randomly selected small subset of the assemblies, have 
been substituted with dummy rods of the same mass. In 
the second case, 10% of the rods have been substituted, 
and in the third case, single rods are substituted.
The 50% defect corresponds roughly to the detection ca­
pability of the digital Cherenkov viewing device (DCVD) [6] 
and the single pin defects correspond to the detection ca­
pability of the passive gamma emission tomography 
(PGET) [7]. Currently, there is no authorized technique for 
detecting defects at the 10% level. However, one objective 
of this study is to evaluate the role for such a technique, 
and we refer to it here as the 10%­technique.
The diversion scenario considered in this study is a continu­
ous accumulation of smaller quantities of fissile material, 
also referred to as roll­up. To our knowledge this is the first 
technical study that investigates detection level as a function 
of diversion scenario and instrument capability in connec­
tion to verification of a large inventory of spent nuclear fuel.
When evaluating the effectiveness of different fuel verifica­
tion techniques, two parameters are of central importance: 
the true positive rate as well as the false positive rate; 
these are denoted here as pdetect and pfalse. The value of 
pdetect is the probability that a fuel assembly with a partial 
defect is correctly identified as such. On the other hand, 
pfalse is the probability that an untampered fuel assembly is 
mistaken for a partial defect assembly. The two parame­
ters play different roles, which is further discussed in sec­
tion 6. These probabilities are connected to the measure­
ment techniques used and are given as input to the Monte 
Carlo sampling. The probability of a successful cumulative 
diversion of, in total, one SQ without detection is denoted 
as Pdivert and is a result of the simulation.
In the simulation, a random sampling of the fuel inventory 
is made.
• First, a number of assemblies in the inventory are select­
ed randomly for diversion, in total adding up to SQ of 
plutonium.
• Second, a number of assemblies in the inventory are se­
lected randomly for verification. The fraction of verified 
assemblies is referred to as Fsample.
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• Third, for each verification, randomized defect tests are 
generated based on the probability pdetect. If a test scores 
a true positive, the diversion attempt is considered to 
have failed.
In the first simulation type, Fsample is varied from 10
­3 to 1.0, 
and different levels of pdetect are tested. With this procedure 
we evaluate the required sampling frequency at different 
levels of pdetect for diversions at fixed defect levels (50%, 
10% and pin level).
However, the detection probability of an instrument is typical­
ly not a constant but will vary with the defect level. For this 
reason, we also perform a second type of simulation with di­
version attempts at different levels of defects, starting from 
single pins and up to 50% detects. Further, in the second 
simulation pdetect is not kept constant. For the DCVD and the 
10%­technique, we assume that pdetect is a function that in­
creases with the size of the defects; while for the PGET we 
assume that pdetect is close to 1.0 for all defect sizes.
In [9] the efficiency of a DCVD for partial defect detection 
was investigated. It was concluded that the measured light 
intensity from spent fuel assemblies agreed with the mod­
eled intensity within ±30%. If the level of pfalse should be 
kept acceptably low, a threshold for defect detection can 
be used that corresponds to pdetect = 1.0 around a 50% de­
fect level. For defects at a 25% level, pdetect will drop to 0.5, 
and for defects close to the single pin level pdetect will be 0. 
In the modeling we therefore assume that pdetect follows 
a soft step function through these points. Similarly, we as­
sume that pdetect for the 10%­technique follows a similar 
soft step function but reaches 1.0 for 10% defects.
The procedure in the second simulation type is similar to 
what is described above for the first type, with the differ­
ence that all three techniques are used together, but with 
different sampling frequencies. Further, if a positive result 
is found, the same assembly is always tested again with 
a more accurate technique. For example, if the DCVD 
makes a positive measurement, it is re­verified with the 
10%­technique, and if the 10%­technique makes a positive 
measurement it is re­verified with the PGET. Once the 
PGET makes a true positive measurement, the diversion 
attempt is considered to have failed.
In the Monte Carlo simulation of the sampling we have 
here assumed that all assemblies sent for encapsulation 
are 17 by 17 PWR type with 264 fuel pins and contain 1% 
plutonium. This is a simplification, but these assumptions 
are trivial to change to the exact conditions for the SNF in­
ventory under consideration. For example, the Swedish in­
ventory consists of a mix of PWR and BWR fuels with burn 
up levels varying from about 10 to 60.
4. Results
The results from the first simulation type are presented in 
figures 1 through 3. In figure 1 we show the probability for 
diversion success of one SQ plutonium (Pdivert) as a func­
tion of sampling frequency. In this case the partial defects 
are on the level of 50% in 17x17 PWR assemblies. The re­
sults show that, given a 95% detection probability of diver­
sion attempts (Pdivert=0.05) and pdetect=0.5­0.75, every fuel 
assembly needs to be verified in order to ensure that one 
SQ of plutonium has not been diverted. Should the sam­
pling be made less frequently, or with a  less accurate 
method, it cannot be ruled out that a diversion of one SQ 
has been made at some place in the fuel inventory.
Figure 1. Probability for diversion success of in total one SQ if fu­
els suffer from a 50% partial defect level. The different curves cor­
respond to different values of pdetect, indicating the level of accura­
cy of the selected instrument at this level of partial defects.
Continuing with figure 2, we show the results of the sam­
pling for the case of defects at a 10% level. Here, the sam­
pling frequency and accuracy needed to detect a total di­
version of one SQ are inversely related. If the accuracy 
(pdetect) is close to 1.0, i.e. the risk of false negatives is 
small; it suffices to test for diversions at this level with 
a sampling frequency of around 1/4. However, if the accu­
racy of the chosen method is lower, the sampling must be 
done more frequently (approaching every assembly) in or­
der to achieve a reasonably low risk for a successful diver­
sion at some place in the inventory.
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Figure 2. Probability for diversion success of in total 1 SQ if fuels 
suffer from a 10% partial defect level. The different curves corre­
spond to different values of pdetect, indicating the level of accuracy 
of the selected instrument at this level of partial defects.
In figure 3 the situation for partial defects at the single pin 
level is shown. Qualitatively it is similar to the situation de­
scribed above, although the required sampling frequencies 
are more than one order of magnitude lower.
Figure 3. Probability for diversion success of in total 1 SQ if fuels 
suffer from a single rod partial defect level. The different curves 
correspond to different values of pdetect, indicating the level of ac­
curacy of the selected instrument at this level of partial defects.
Finally, in figure 4 we show the results of the second simu­
lation type with all three instruments operating in parallel. 
The different sampling rates used are based on the results 
presented above, from the first simulation type. For the 
DCVD and the 10%­technique, we sample every assembly 
and every ¼ assembly, respectively. However, for the 
PGET we test two sample rates. The two curves in figure 4 
correspond to sampling every 1/100 assembly with the 
PGET, while the dashed red curve corresponds to sam­
pling every 1/20 assembly.
While a sampling of every 1/100 assembly with the PGET 
is adequate to detect a diversion of 1 SQ from multiple sin­
gle pin defects, there is a blind spot for diversions around 
2%, which corresponds to about 5 pins per assembly. For 
such diversions, 1 SQ is acquired too quickly, and the 
10%­technique is not yet sensitive enough to detect the 
defects. However, with a sampling of every 1/20 assembly 
with the PGET (dashed red curve) the blind spot is re­
duced significantly.
Figure 4. Probability for successive diversion of in total 1 SQ at 
varying levels of defects, from single pin to 50%. The solid blue 
and dashed red curves correspond to sampling 1/100 and 1/20, 
respectively, of all fuel assemblies with the PGET instrument
Some implications can be noted from the results in this 
paper. Diversions can take place with varying levels of de­
fects, and the sampling procedure must take this into ac­
count. If a diversion scenario considers large defects from 
a few assemblies, one SQ can be acquired relatively fast. 
Consequently, a sampling of every assembly has to be 
made with a quick and robust method that can reliably de­
tect large defect levels. Here we used a maximum of 50% 
of the rods missing, and the probability for true positive 
detections, pdetect, must be kept around 75% or higher. On 
the other hand, if a diversion is made from small quantities 
over long times, it is only necessary to sample a (small) 
subset of the assemblies to detect one manipulated fuel 
assembly. However, the measurement technique must be 
capable of detecting small defects. We used an example 
of partial defects on the single rod level, and depending on 
the level of pdetect, somewhere between 1/500 and 1/100 of 
all assemblies must be assayed. However, this number in­
creases to about 1/20 of all assemblies when
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5.  Discussion
The nuclear safeguards verification needs to be non­intru­
sive and interfere with regular operations of the facility to 
a minimum extent. Currently, the DCVD [6] is authorized to 
be used for verification of defects on a level of 50%. The 
operation of a DCVD is straightforward, quick and in many 
aspect non­intrusive, and sampling every assembly should 
not pose a serious interference with the routine operations 
of the facility.
At the other end of the spectrum, passive gamma emis­
sion tomography (PGET) of the fuel assemblies has the 
potential to detect single missing rods from fuel assem­
blies. In comparison to the DCVD, it is more time consum­
ing and requires the fuel to be moved to a dedicated 
measurement station. Sampling every assembly would 
likely result in a serious interference with the operations of 
the facility. However, individual diversions at the level of 
a few pins are small enough to allow for a sampling fre­
quency at 1/20 or lower, which could be more easily incor­
porated into the facility operations. Under the assumption 
that one copper canister consisting of four PWR assem­
blies is filled each day, it would only be necessary to use 
the PGET a few times every week.
However, with the currently available measurement tech­
niques, detecting possible diversions at a defect level of 
about 10% poses a considerable challenge. Actually, this 
concerns any partial defect level between 50% and a few 
pins. Such defects cannot be reliably detected with the 
DCVD technique and there is no other technique existing 
today for partial defect verification at that level today. While 
a PGET device could in principle be used to detect defects 
at about 10% with very high accuracy (pdetect≈1.0), the re­
quired sampling frequency would still be comparably high. 
In the case of a facility for encapsulation of PWR assem­
blies, around 1/4 of the assemblies would have to be sam­
pled. This would mean that the PGET would have to be 
operated several times per day.
Instead, adding a third measurement technique capable 
of reliably detecting defects at the 10% level, but with 
a measurement time significantly shorter than the PGET, 
is preferable. With three systems running in parallel, a ro­
bust verification of defects at all levels can be made with 
little interference with the routine operations of the facility. 
The DCVD could be used for all assemblies, the 
10%­technique a few times per day, and the PGET a few 
times per week.
Finally, the importance of pfalse, i.e. the probability for a false 
positive result, must also be considered. A likely sampling 
procedure would be that a positive result using a course 
technique, e.g. a DCVD scanning for 50% defects, is fol­
lowed by an examination using a more accurate technique 
designed for defects at the 10% level in order to verify if 
the positive result is an actual defect or a measurement 
error. Likewise, a positive assay with a technique designed 
to detect defects at the 10% level would be followed by an 
examination using the most precise instrument, the PGET.
However, if pfalse is too high, the use of the more accurate 
measurement technique would be dominated by verifying 
false positive assemblies identified by less accurate tech­
niques. Optimizing the sampling procedure requires de­
tailed knowledge of pdetect and pfalse, which is beyond the 
scope of the paper. But we do note that the two probabili­
ties are likely related. Setting a low threshold for a positive 
result, can increase the value of pdetect, which would result 
in a lower required sampling frequency. But at the same 
time, a lower threshold is also likely to result in a higher 
false positive rate, which would increase the usage of 
more precise instruments. Likewise, while longer measure­
ment times interfere more with the operations of the facili­
ty, they can also potentially reduce noise and increase 
pdetect as well as decrease pfalse, and therefore lessen the in­
terference with the facility operations.
6. Conclusion
This simulation study aims at investigating how spent nu­
clear fuel can be sampled for the purpose of verifying de­
fects, for instance before encapsulation and placement in 
a difficult­to­access storage. The fuel assemblies are ex­
pected to be measured in order to draw conclusions on 
gross and partial defect verification. The nuclear safe­
guards verification needs to be non­intrusive and to inter­
fere with regular operations of the facility to a minimum 
extent.
The results show the importance of having an available se­
lection of partial instruments capable of detecting varying 
levels of partial defects. Instruments that can quickly sur­
vey a large fuel inventory and give results on whether or 
not a large fraction of the fuel material has been diverted, 
are valuable in excluding a diversion scenario where large 
amounts of nuclear material are removed from a few items. 
On the other hand, instruments that are able to perform 
partial defect verification on a low level, e.g. single rods 
missing, are very valuable for excluding a roll­up scenario.
Currently, there are authorized instruments that can be 
used to verify partial defects on a level of 50% as well as 
single missing rods. The results here show that, assuming 
an interest for keeping the sampling frequency with the 
PGET low, there is a motivation for developing instruments 
capable of verifying defects at a level around 10%. Without 
such instruments, one is referred to an extensive use of 
the PGET. If a 10%­technique can be found that is quick 
and robust, its extensive use may not be a problem.
Further, one should keep in mind that partial defect tests 
might not be the only verification that needs to be made. 
There could also be an interest to perform additional 
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assays to verify the fuel parameters (cooling time, burnup 
and initial enrichment). If such a measurement can provide 
a defect test at a 10% level as well, it can be used as 
a complement to a PGET.
Finally, it can also be pointed out that the PGET does not 
directly probe the fissile content in the assembly, but infers 
it indirectly from measurements of the gamma emission 
from fission products. In a diversion scenario where dum­
my replacement rods have been loaded with Cs­137 
a PGET would not detect the diversion.
Consequently, there could also be an interest to employ 
other methods that directly probe the fissile content of 
the assemblies, even if such methods have a lower sensi­
tivity than the PGET. Examples are neutron­based tech­
niques such as the differential die away self interrogation 
(DDSI) [10].
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Abstract:
In August of 2017, the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) issued the “Application of Safeguards to Geological 
Repositories (ASTOR) Report on Technologies Potentially 
Useful for Safeguarding Geological Repositories.” In this 
IAEA report, the nuclear safeguards experts convened 
made recommendat ions on var ious aspects of 
encapsulation facility and repository safeguards. Specific 
to the non-destructive assay (NDA) requirements, the 
ASTOR experts made six specific recommendations. To 
satisfy these recommendations, a team working under the 
direction of the Finnish Radiation and Safety Authority 
researched the capability of an integrated NDA system 
that combines the capabilities of a  Passive Gamma 
Emission Tomography (PGET) instrument, a  Passive 
Neutron Albedo Reactivity (PNAR) instrument and a load 
cell. The current study focuses a conceptual design of the 
PNAR instrument capable of supporting several of the 
IAEA recommendations. To enable this research goal, the 
performance of a PNAR instrument, designed to measure 
boiling water reactor assemblies, was simulated using fuel 
with the isotopic content representative of fuel of various 
initial enrichments, burnups and cooling times. The 
research results illustrate the capability of the PNAR 
instrument to fulfil the IAEA recommendations while using 
robust, relatively simple, hardware.
Keywords: non­destructive assay, encapsulation safe­
guards, PNAR
1. Introduction
In August of 2017 the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) issued the “Application of Safeguards to Geological 
Repositories (ASTOR) Report on Technologies Potentially 
Useful for Safeguarding Geological Repositories” [1]. For 
the formulation of this report, the IAEA convened groups of 
experts on specific topics to provide recommendation on 
various aspects of encapsulation facility and repository 
safeguards; this current study focuses on the Finnish im­
plementation of the ASTOR Group recommendations in 
the context of a non­destructive assay (NDA) system. The 
mandate of the ASTOR NDA Focus Group was to improve 
upon the state­of­the­practice given the extremely difficult 
to access nature of fuel placed in a  deep geological 
repository. The NDA system proposed by Finland satisfies 
all the recommendations set forth by the NDA Focus 
Group by integrating a Passive Gamma Emission Tomog­
raphy [1, 2, 3, 4] instrument with a Passive Neutron Albedo 
Reactivity (PNAR) instrument [1, 5, 6, 7]. The purpose of 
the current study is to describe how the PNAR instrument 
helps strengthen the NDA system in the implementation of 
the IAEA recommendations while using robust, relatively 
simple, hardware that can measure the assembly 
multiplication.
2.  Requirements for the encapsulation NDA 
system
Below is a list of suggested characteristics for the NDA 
system of a spent fuel assembly encapsulation facility. The 
list was created by the NDA Focus Group convened by the 
IAEA as part of ASTOR.
a. Capability to detect individual pins, even though it is 
recognized that pin level detection might not be pos­
sible for all assembly fuel types and for all burnup and 
cooling time scenarios.
b. Capability to verify that the declared assembly is con­
sistent with measured signatures: Enough information 
is provided in the declaration of each assembly to pre­
dict, within useful limits, some measurable signatures 
from each assembly. Once predicted, a comparison 
between expectation and measurement is possible and 
recommended.
c. Capability to measure assembly neutron multiplica­
tion: The neutron multiplication of an assembly can be 
measured with the neutron signal. Furthermore, this 
multiplication can also be calculated from the declara­
tion. Multiplication is singled out in this list for its close 
connection to the presence of fissile material and be­
cause it is a bulk property of the assembly.
d. Robustness, low maintenance and low false alarm rate 
must all be properties of the NDA system. The NDA 
system should not significantly impede facility opera­
tion; duplicate systems are recommended in addition to 
using robust technology.
e. System should be difficult to trick with pin substitution. 
As noted in Chapter 1 of [1], “all individual NDA tech­
niques … can be tricked by a well­designed pin re­
placement.” Hence, the aggregate NDA system needs 
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to make well­designed pin replacement extremely diffi­
cult to plausibly/usefully perpetrate.
f. Capability to measure the total weight: A measurement 
of the assembly weight is considered relatively simple 
and able to contribute one more constraint a ‘would 
be’ proliferator needs to satisfy in designing a diversion 
scenario.
Fulfilling all the characteristics listed above will require an 
integrated NDA system. The focus of this paper is to de­
scribe how the PNAR instrument contributes to fulfilling 
characteristics (b) through (e).
For characteristic (a) Passive Gamma Emission Tomogra­
phy (PGET) instrument is expected to provide pin level de­
tection capability in Finland. Recent research on the NDA 
system intended for the Finnish encapsulation facilities in­
dicates that detection of every pin in a boiling water reac­
tor (BWR) assembly should be straightforward, while de­
tection of every pin in a VVER­440 assembly, is a topic of 
ongoing research in Finland and at the IAEA [2, 3].
3. Passive neutron albedo reactivity physics
The PNAR NDA technique involves the comparison of the 
neutron count rate for an object when that object is meas­
ured in two different setups. One setup is designed to en­
hance neutron multiplication while the other setup is de­
signed to suppress it. As implemented for the Finnish BWR 
fuel, the high multiplying section was produced by the as­
sembly in the water of the pool, while the low multiplying 
section was created by putting 1 mm of Cd as close as 
possible to the fuel while it remained in the pool. Cd was 
selected due to its extremely large absorption cross­sec­
tion for all neutron energies below ~0.5 eV. The PNAR sig­
nature is calculated by dividing the count rate measured in 
the high multiplying section by the count rate measured in 
the low multiplying section.
The first PNAR experiments with an assembly geometry 
were performed with a  15x15 fresh assembly; a  252Cf 
source was imbedded in the assembly to increase the 
neutron flux. The results showed a healthy change in the 
PNAR signature with changes in the average initial enrich­
ment of the assembly [5]. An experiment using fresh rods 
in air was performed inside of a multiplicity counter show­
ing that the sensitivity of a PNAR instrument will increase if 
the detectors efficiency is elevated enough to support cor­
related neutron detection [8]. The first use of a PNAR with 
spent fuel was performed with Fugen fuel. The main con­
clusion was that PNAR was able to discern levels of neu­
tron multiplication; the results of the Fugen experiments 
were much less dynamic than is expected for typical com­
mercial fuel setups because (1) the Fugen fuel contained 
little fissile material as the fuel was irradiated in heavy wa­
ter, (2) the water gap around the fuel was approximately tri­
ple that which is expected for commercial fuel [9].
The PNAR implementation planned for Finland, an imple­
mentation that combines (a) a 3He detector tube and poly­
ethylene surrounded by Cd and (b) a low multiplying sec­
tion produced with a Cd­liner, lends itself to a conceptual 
discussion of the PNAR physics. The only significant differ­
ence in the measured count rate for a  section of fuel 
measured in both the high and low multiplying sections, is 
the counts resulting from the multiplication caused by the 
neutrons that were absorbed in the Cd­liner. The counts 
produced by the neutrons not absorbed in the Cd­liner are 
in both the numerator and denominator of the PNAR Ratio 
so these high­energy neutrons that are unaffected by the 
Cd­liner create a PNAR Ratio of 1.0; any deviation from 1.0 
is due to counts produced by chain reactions initiated by 
neutrons that are absorbed by the Cd­liner. Because the 
PNAR signal is produced by the neutrons returning into the 
fuel with an energy below the Cd­cutoff energy of ~0.5 eV, 
the PNAR technique is sometimes described as interrogat­
ing the fuel with low energy neutrons from the location of 
the Cd­liner.
There are two options for implementing the Finnish con­
ceptual PNAR design: (1) either the Cd­liner is moved in 
and out of position to create the high and low multiplying 
setups, or (2) the fuel is moved between two detectors 
sections for which one section is high multiplying and the 
second section is low multiplying. The two sections in this 
later case could be identical in all ways except for the pres­
ence of a  0.5 mm thick sheet of Cd approximately 
0.5 m long in the axial direction for the low multiplying sec­
tion. This latter option can be implemented by putting the 
low and high multiplying sections on top of each other; in 
this case, the fuel is moved vertically about a meter be­
tween the two measurements to assure the same section 
of fuel is measured in both detector sections. The latter 
case has more flexibility to change the multiplication in that 
more than just Cd can be changed to differentiate be­
tween the two sections. In the case of Finland, moving the 
Cd­liner is expected. This has the benefit of requiring only 
one detector bank and the PNAR measurement can be 
completed without moving the fuel. As a result, the PNAR 
measurement can be completed during the same time as 
the PGET measurement.
4. Passive neutron albedo reactivity hardware
The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) of Fin­
land commissioned the conceptual design of a PNAR in­
strument as part of an NDA System designed to meet the 
safeguards and safety needs of Finland in the context of 
spent fuel encapsulation and geological disposal. The ge­
ometry of the PNAR instrument needs to be adapted to 
the dimensions of each fuel type. In the case of Finland, 
because different fuel types reside at different facilities, 
BWR­speci f ic and V VER­speci f ic designs were 
developed.
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In Figure 1 and Figure 2, two cross­cutting images of 
the conceptual design for BWR assemblies are illustrat­
ed. The size of some of the key components of the 
PNAR detector are the following: The 3He tubes are 
17.4 mm in diameter with a fill pressure of 6 atm and an 
active length of 0.2 m. The lead, needed to reduce the 
gamma dose to the 3He tubes, is 52 mm thick at is 
thickest. All Cd layers are 1 mm thick. The Cd­liner sur­
rounds the fuel and is 0.74 m long; shorter length liners 
are under investigation. The starting point for the design 
involved calculating the amount of lead needed to keep 
the gamma dose to the 3He tube below 0.2 Gy/hr limit 
for a 0.35 m active length tube [10]. The second step in­
volved optimizing the polyethylene near the tube for the 
largest count rate possible. The final step involved mak­
ing sure the count rate did not exceed the recommend­
ed maximum count rate of 5 x 104 count/s for the se­
lected tube [11].
In this section, the hardware used to implement the PNAR 
concept is described with an emphasis placed on how the 
PNAR design partially fulfils characteristic (d) of the ASTOR 
Experts Group, which recommends the use of robust, low 
maintenance hardware. The fulfilment of this recommen­
dation is addressed while describing the key component 
of the PNAR instrument by comparing, when applicable, 
the hardware used in implementing the PNAR concept to 
that of a Fork detector [12, 13]. The Fork detector was se­
lected because it is a robust safeguards instrument, which 
has been used in the field for several decades:
1. With the inclusion of an ion chamber, the PNAR instru­
ment as designed is effectively a high efficiency Fork 
detector with reduced positioning uncertainty due to (a) 
detectors located on each of the 4 sides of the fuel and 
(b) a smaller water gap between the fuel and the detec­
tor than with a Fork. Note that the second set of detec­
tors, which are located above and below the assem­
bly in Figure 2, are not visible because they are located 
0.1 m below the illustrated detectors. STUK is currently 
investigating a PNAR design with all detectors on one 
axial level.
2. The key to implementing the PNAR concept is the “Cd­
liner” that is depicted between the fuel and lead section 
of the detector. Note that this Cd­liner is only present 
for one of the two PNAR measurements.
3. A second layer of Cd, around the polyethylene, sur­
rounds each 3He tube. This Cd ensures that the detec­
tor only detects epithermal and fast neutrons from the 
fuel; in some Fork detector designs, Cd is also used for 
this purpose. A more uniform spatial sensitivity across 
the assembly is achieved by detecting these higher en­
ergy neutrons [5].
Figure 1. Vertical cross­sectional view of the BWR PNAR detector 
along one side of a  BWR fuel assembly. The  lead  shielding is 
0.128 m  vertically and 0.117 m  horizontally. Proportions are 
accurate.
Figure 2. Horizontal cross­sectional view of the BWR PNAR de­
tector relative to a 10x10 BWR fuel assembly, which is 0.126 m on 
a side. The detector units illustrated here span 0.128 m in the ver­
tical direction below the vertical midplane of the detector. An iden­
tical set of detectors span the 0.128 m  in the vertical direction 
above the midplane; these additional detectors look identical to 
those depicted here except they are rotated 90 degrees around 
the center of the fuel. Proportions are accurate.
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There are three aspects of the PNAR hardware, as simu­
lated, that deviate from the hardware of a Fork detector:
1. 3He tubes are used instead of fission chambers. This 
selection was made to obtain the desired precision for 
typical fuel assemblies in two minutes or less. Fission 
chambers or boron tubes could be used if longer count 
times are acceptable. The lead is present to reduce the 
gamma dose to the 3He tubes; the lead would not be 
necessary if fission chambers are used; yet given that 
the installation is permanent, the weight of lead is not 
a significant concern.
2. The instrument is designed with the expectation that 
the fuel will be inserted from above into the detector. 
The detectors are located on the 4 sides of the assem­
bly; it is expected that the instrument will not measure 
locations near the ends of the assembly. This selec­
tion was made to reduce the sensitivity to anisotropy in 
the assembly burnup. If such an uncertainty is not too 
large, a reduction to two detectors on opposite sides of 
the fuel is acceptable.
3. The presence of a 1 mm thick, 0.74 m long axial Cd­
liner. This sheet of metal is the sole PNAR component 
that is not necessary for a Fork detector.
5.  Simulated passive neutron albedo reactivity 
signature
To access the capability of the PNAR detector to measure 
spent fuel, the PNAR ratio was calculated using the aver­
age isotopic content of 12 assemblies that span a range of 
initial enrichment (3, 4 and 5 wt.%), burnup (15, 30, 40 and 
60 GWd/tU) and cooling time (20, 40 and 80 years) values. 
The Monte Carlo N­Particle Code (MCNP6™), Version 6 
[14] was used for the PNAR simulations while the isotopic 
mixture of the various assemblies was produced by the 
Monteburns code [15] as part of the Next Generation Safe­
guards Initiative [16, 17].
Figure 3 shows the calculated PNAR ratio versus burnup 
for 12 different assemblies in fresh water. Two simulations 
were run to calculate each data point, once with the Cd­
liner in place and once without the Cd­liner. All data points 
in Fig. 3 are for fuel with a 20­years cooling time.
The PNAR Ratio values for all the data points with ratios 
above 1.1 were simulated in the standard manner, mean­
ing that all neutrons, and subsequent reactions that they 
may cause, were followed until the neutrons were either 
absorbed or left the extremities of the simulation; any nu­
clear reactions that produced additional neutrons, such as 
induced fission, were followed through to fruition.
For the three assemblies considered to be nearly fully irra­
diated, given their initial enrichment and burnup values, 
which are the assemblies with PNAR Ratios of about 1.14, 
additional simulations were performed to calculate the 
PNAR ratio for the case when no induced fission could 
take place. The three assemblies are the following: (a) 
3 wt.%, 30 GWd/tU, (b) 4 wt.%, 45 GWd/tU, (a) 5 wt.%, 
60 GWd/tU; these assemblies are labelled separately in 
Fig. 4. For these 3 assemblies, induced fission reactions 
became absorption reactions. This is a useful exercise be­
cause it indicates the signal expected if all the fuel were re­
placed with a non­multiplying material. This change in the 
simulation was accomplished by adding the “NONU” card 
to the simulation. The calculated PNAR Ratio for each of 
these assemblies with the NONU card is 1.002, 1.003 and 
1.008, respectively. The absolute value of the uncertainty 
on the PNAR ratio, propagated from the MCNP6™ statisti­
cal uncertainty, is 0.003 for all points. The vertical extent of 
each data point in Figure 3 is approximately 4 times the 
propagated statistical uncertainty calculated with 
MCNP6™.
Figure 3. the BWR PNAR Ratio, simulated with fresh water, is il­
lustrated as a function of burnup for 12 assemblies of various ini­
tial enrichments and burnup values; 3 assemblies were simulated 
using the nonu card. The cooling time is 20 years. The vertical 
extent of each data point is approximately equal to 4­sigma of 
statistical uncertainty arising from the simulated statistics.
The following are key points concluded from Figure 3:
1. The change in the PNAR Ratio with increasing burnup 
is a smooth decreasing function of burnup for a given 
initial enrichment. If an assembly starts with more po­
tential nuclear energy, it will be measured to have an el­
evated PNAR ratio when fresh.
2. Fully irradiated assemblies, regardless of their initial en­
richment, are expected to have nearly the same PNAR 
Ratio.
3. The change in the PNAR Ratio between a fresh 4 wt.% 
assembly and a 4 wt.% assembly that was irradiated to 
45 GWd/tU is approximately the same as the change 
in the PNAR Ratio calculated between a fully irradiated 
assembly and an assembly for which all the pins were 
replaced with non­multiplying material.
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In Figure 4, the PNAR Ratio is graphed as a function of the 
“net multiplication;” which is calculated by the MCNP6 code 
by taking the ratio of the number of neutrons started in the 
fuel to the number of neutrons followed during the course of 
the simulation. Note that the net multiplication is calculated for 
the case of neutrons starting from all the pins in the assembly 
with the energy sampled from a Watt fission spectrum. The 
data points in Figure 4 include all the same data points illus­
trated in Figure 3 as well as 6 additional assemblies. These 
additional assemblies are for the three nearly fully irradiated 
assemblies already discussed; however, the isotopic content 
was “aged” to represent that which is expected for cooling 
times of 40 and 80­years, in addition to the 20­year cooling 
time case from Figure 3. The main point for including these 
assemblies is to show that the 9 fully irradiated assemblies 
occupy a small area of the overall parameter space; addition­
ally, among these 9 assemblies, the 3 assemblies with the 
same initial enrichment but cooling times of 20, 40 and 80 
years are clustered in an even smaller area.
Figure 4. the PNAR Ratio is graphed as a function of the net mul­
tiplication. 3 assemblies with cooling times of 40 years and 3 as­
semblies with cooling times of 80 years were included compared 
to Figure 3. All these longer­cooled assemblies group around 
a net multiplication value of 1.41 and a PNAR Ratio of 1.14 and 
are labeled as “fully irradiated assemblies.”
The conclusions drawn from Figure 4 are the following:
1. Regardless of initial enrichment, burnup or cooling 
time, there is a smooth relationship between the PNAR 
Ratio and net multiplication.
2. There is a change of between 0.13 and 0.14 in the 
PNAR Ratio between any irradiated assembly and 
a non­multiplying assembly.
3. Almost all assemblies to be measured at an encapsu­
lation facility will be fully irradiated. Hence, a near con­
stant PNAR Ratio will be measured for all these assem­
blies; if the current simulations are representative, that 
value will be around 1.14.
4. From Figure 4, we can see that the impact of cooling 
time is relatively small, the 9 fully irradiated assemblies 
all have net multiplications values of around 1.4 and 
PNAR Ratios of around 1.14.
Because the uncertainty of the PNAR instrument is con­
nected to how useful the instrument can be, the results from 
a separate report examining the anticipated uncertainty are 
summarized here [18]. In that report, the uncertainties due 
to the following were examined: (a) assembly position in the 
instrument, (b) counting statistics given a total measurement 
time of 5­minutes, (c) estimated uncertainty given non­uni­
form irradiation. The end conclusion was that a rough esti­
mate of the 1­sigma uncertainty in the PNAR Ratio is antici­
pated to be +/­ 0.005 for a typical BWR assembly (32 GWd/
tU, 40­year cooled) given a 5 minute total count time; while 
the coolest assemblies (17 GWd/tU, 60­year cooled) will 
likely need a 20­minute count time to obtain a similar uncer­
tainty. To put the 0.005 value in some context, a 0.005 vari­
ation in the PNAR Ratio corresponds to the change in the 
multiplication caused by a burnup variation of 1.4 GWd/tU. 
Additionally, if a fully irradiated assembly were replaced with 
a non­multiplying assembly, then the PNAR Ratio should 
change from 1.142 to 1.002 for a net change of 0.140; this 
represents a change of 28 sigma; the main point being that 
a significant removal of fissile material from the assembly will 
be easily detected.
A point worth emphasizing is that the PNAR technique ful­
fils the recommendations of the IAEA ASTOR group that 
the NDA system be “capable of measuring assembly neu­
tron multiplication.”
6. Merit of an integrated NDA system
The ASTOR Experts Group recommendations (b) and (e) 
are discussed together within the context of the merits of 
an integrated NDA system. Characteristic (b) involves veri­
fying the declaration with the measured signatures, while 
characteristic (e) involves creating an NDA system that is 
difficult to trick.
The integrated Finnish NDA system suggested by STUK 
has the following measured signatures:
1. Relative distribution of the gamma ray emission within 
a horizontal cross­section of an assembly with pin lev­
el resolution using the PGET instrument. The PGET in­
strument [2], after recent refurbishment by IAEA [3], has 
shown a capability for automated detection of single or 
multiple missing pins in BWR and VVER­440 fuel. How­
ever, improved image reconstruction and analysis tech­
niques are still required [4].
2. Absolute gross gamma intensity as measured by ion 
chambers, which are built into the PNAR instrument, 
and the absolute 137Cs count rate as measured by the 
CZT detectors of the PGET instrument.
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3. Absolute neutron count rate as measured with the 
PNAR detector and the boron­tube neutron detectors 
in the PGET instrument.
4. Absolute neutron multiplication as measured with the 
PNAR detector.
The analytic approach of the Finnish NDA system has two 
separate parts: (a) One part analyses the PGET informa­
tion to create relative­intensity gamma­ray images. (b) The 
second analytic approach uses the information declared 
by the state to calculate the multiplication, absolute gam­
ma and neutron source terms. Considerable research 
along these lines was performed by Euratom and Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory researchers [19]. Their analytic 
approach uses both SCALE [20] and MCNP6™ to calcu­
late the assembly multiplication as well as the neutron and 
gamma flux from the fuel to any relevant detectors.
Focusing on the SCALE/MCNP6™ portion of the analysis for 
the Finnish case, the gamma intensity measured by both the 
CZT and ion chambers can be compared to the values cal­
culated by SCALE and MCNP6™ from the declaration. Simi­
larly, the total neutron count rate and the neutron multiplica­
tion can be calculated from the declaration and compared to 
the measured values. In the case of the measured multiplica­
tion, either the PNAR Ratio itself could be calculated or a cali­
brated correlation between the net multiplication and the 
PNAR Ratio, as illustrated in Figure 4, could be used.
An additional possible part of the analysis could involve the 
calculation of the neutron source term. The neutron source 
term is equal to the total neutron emission divided by the 
net multiplication. Given the relationship between the net 
multiplication and the PNAR Ratio illustrated in Figure 4, 
the intensity of the neutron source term can be calculated.
In summary, ASTOR characteristic (b), which involves veri­
fying the State declaration, will be satisfied for the long­
cooled fuel of interest in Finland by measuring the follow­
ing characteristics of the fuel:
1. Both the absolute gross gamma intensity and 137Cs 
count rate will be measured and compared to simula­
tion; both signatures vary with a 30.2 year half­life for 
longer cooling times.
2. Total neutron count rate will be measured with the 
PNAR detector and with the boron­tube neutron detec­
tors in the PGET instrument and compared to simula­
tion. This signature primarily varies with the 18.1 year 
half­life of 244Cm.
3. Neutron multiplication will be measured with the PNAR 
detector and compared to simulation; a signature that 
is expected to vary by ~5% as the fuel ages from 20 to 
80 years [21].
Combining the above list with a total weight measurement 
and the 2­dimensional, pin­localizing, image of the pin gam­
ma ray intensities produced by PGET, the challenge a ‘would 
be’ proliferator has in tricking the integrated NDA system is 
imposing. This proliferator would need to do all the following:
1. Emit gamma rays with the correct energy/energies and 
relative intensity from all the pins in a BWR or a VVER­
440 assembly.
2. Emit 137Cs photons and/or create an absolute current in 
the ion chambers that is consistent with the initial en­
richment, burnup and cooling time of the declaration.
3. Produce two specific and related neutron count rates 
when the assembly is measured in two different neu­
trons reflecting setups. The relative intensity of the 
count rates, which is the indication of the level of multi­
plication, must be consistent with the initial enrichment, 
burnup and cooling time of the declaration.
4. Keep the assembly weight within the uncertainty limits 
of the weight measurement.
Given (a) the time varying complexity of the signatures (T1/2 
= 30.2 years for 662 keV photons from 137Cs, T1/2 = 18.1 
years for total neutrons given the dominance of 244Cm, 
while the multiplication remains nearly constant as function 
of time) and (b) the pin level resolved image from PGET, 
the proposed NDA system is “difficult to trick with pin sub­
stitution”; hence ASTOR recommendation (e), is satisfied.
7. Conclusion
The PNAR instrument is a robust instrument made from 
mature off­the­shelf hardware. Combined with a PGET, the 
integrated instrument satisfies all the characteristics sug­
gested by the NDA Focus Group convened by the IAEA as 
part of the ASTOR Experts Group: (a) For pin level detec­
tion, PGET is expected to be able to detect single and 
multiple missing pins in BWR and VVER­440 fuel. If there 
will be cases where this detection capability is not fully as­
sured, the integrated NDA system will detect the absence 
of fuel when significant inconsistencies are detected 
among the multiplication, total neutron or gamma signa­
tures. (b) For declaration verification, the measured multi­
plication, neutron and gamma signatures will be compared 
to the calculated values for each of these signatures that 
used the declaration as input values. (c) The multiplication 
will be measured by a PNAR instrument calibrated with 
known assemblies. (d) The hardware is expected to be ro­
bust and low­maintenance. (e) Given the range of meas­
ured signatures: spatial gamma ray emission, total neutron 
and gamma count rates, multiplication and assembly 
weight, combined with declaration­based analysis; the 
overall system is difficult to trick with pin substitution.
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Abstract:
Geological repositories will be built in several countries for 
the long term storage of spent nuclear fuel. Sweden and 
Finland, for example, foresee the encapsulation of the 
spent fuel assemblies in copper canisters with iron inserts 
to be deposited in tunnels excavated about 500 metres 
underground in the bedrock. During the transport of 
canisters and the storage in the final repository, the 
Continuity of Knowledge (CoK) of spent fuel must be kept. 
Safeguards requirements suggest the implementation of 
a unique identification tag on copper canisters, strongly 
reliable and secure against falsification attempts. This 
paper presents a solution for the canisters’ authentication 
issue, using an innovative ultrasonic investigation of the 
internal gap between copper lid and canister tube. It 
provides a fingerprint strictly related to material features 
after the friction stir welding process. This fingerprint can 
be combined with the ultrasonic response of a unique 
code made by chamfers machined on the copper lid inner 
sur face. The angular matching between the two 
fingerprints (internal gap response and chamfers’ code 
reading) realizes a third signature more robust and reliable. 
A potential practical implementation of this solution is 
described experimentally in this paper.
Keywords: copper canisters; authentication; ultrasounds; 
encapsulation plant; geological repository.
1. Introduction
The spent fuel coming from nuclear reactors is an environ­
mental hazard and it must be safely managed according 
to Safety, Security and Safeguards requirements. Several 
countries, among which Sweden and Finland, are planning 
to construct geological repositories for the storage of their 
spent fuel. According to this new approach, the fuel will be 
encapsulated in copper canisters with iron inserts, depos­
ited in tunnels 500 m underground and covered by ben­
tonite clay. Geological repositories, in fact, would be able 
to insulate the spent fuel from human beings and the envi­
ronment without requiring supervision or maintenance af­
ter closing [1]. Figure 1 shows the structure of the geologi­
cal repository planned to be built in Sweden.
Figure 1. Design of the geological repository proposed for Sweden with its 66­kilometre of tunnels. Source: SKB.
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The fuel stored in underwater storage ponds is moved to 
the encapsulation plant where it is introduced in copper 
canisters. Canisters are then sealed by Friction Stir Weld­
ing (FSW) then, for Sweden, they are inserted into trans­
port casks sent by ship to the final repository. For Finland, 
the encapsulation plant will be built just above the geologi­
cal repository, so no transport casks needed. The analysis 
of threat, diversion strategies and safeguards requirements 
for a geological repository stressed the importance of 
keeping the Continuity of Knowledge (CoK) of spent fuel 
during transport from the encapsulation plant to the final 
storage or during the storage of canisters before the depo­
sition in tunnels. Containment and Surveillance (C/S) 
measures have to be implemented in the encapsulation 
process and on the transportation cask [2]. Moreover, the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Euro­
pean Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) recommend­
ed to use canister identification to support the CoK of 
spent fuel [3].
Engraving of the canister’s external surface is a practical 
and simple solution but may affect the long­term integrity of 
the container and then must be carefully considered. More­
over an engraving on the external surface can be easily re­
produced and then it is not secure against falsification at­
tempts. Considering alternative solutions, the most common 
technologies used for tagging of nuclear items include 
seals, Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags, SERS 
(Surface­Enhanced Raman Scattering) ­Active Nanoparticle 
Aggregates tags, Tungsten­based identifier, reflective laser 
scanning tags, reflective particle tags (RPT) and ultrasonic 
systems [4]. All these techniques could potentially provide 
a unique identification for canisters but only ultrasounds 
could satisfy both the requirements of identification and au­
thentication at the same time [5]. In 2015 the SSM asked the 
Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European Commission 
for a feasibility study on copper canisters identification by ul­
trasounds. This research has been carried out by the Seals 
and Identification Laboratory (SILab) of the JRC in Ispra (Ita­
ly) in collaboration with the Department of Information Engi­
neering at the University of Florence (Italy). The SILab has 
a long time experience on ultrasonic techniques applied on 
bolt seals with artificial cavities made of stainless steel 
washers with cavities, giving a fingerprint from the reflection 
of unique patterns [6]. Concerning copper canisters, the ge­
ometry and dimension of the container are much bigger 
than a seal; therefore, an adaption of the ultrasonic methods 
should be implemented.
The following chapters describe the development of the 
new solution for the identification and authentication of cop­
per canisters by ultrasounds. The first part illustrates the ba­
sic idea of the new method and the preliminary studies car­
ried out on copper specimens to verify the propagation of 
ultrasounds in the material. Afterwards the experimental 
tests carried out at the SKB’s Canister laboratory in Oskar­
shamn (Sweden) are reported and results are analysed.
2.  Ultrasonic authentication of copper 
canisters
The method used for labelling copper canisters must be 
tamper indicating by a unique identity (identification) and 
must provide evidence of counterfeiting or duplication (au­
thentication). For this purpose, the method developed by 
the SILab is based on the combination of two fingerprints, 
one artificial and one natural. The first is realized by ma­
chining chamfers on the inner surface of the copper lid, 
creating a unique code readable from the outside by an in­
clined ultrasonic transducer with water poured on the lid. 
The study of this identification method has been already 
described by the authors in [7] and [7]. Results of simula­
tion and experimental tests made on a reduced scaled 
copper lid with chamfers, pointed out the possibility to ac­
quire ultrasonic echoes with a good signal to noise ratio. 
The code made by chamfers is then clearly detectable by 
ultrasounds but it is not robust enough in case of falsifica­
tion or duplication attempts. Therefore, an authentication 
signature is necessary to verify the originality of canisters. 
This paper is focused on the study of an authentication 
method based on the ultrasonic investigation of the natural 
fingerprint, intrinsically contained in copper canisters after 
the FSW process. The general idea of the method and its 
validation is described in the following paragraphs.
2.1 The method
The nuclear spent fuel to be stored in geological reposito­
ries is preserved by an insert of nodular cast iron that gives 
mechanical stability and an outer copper shell which pro­
vides protection against corrosion. The copper canister is 
about 5 metres in length and 1 metre in diameter [9]. The 
minimum copper thickness is 50 mm to fulfil mechanical 
design requirements [10] (Figure 2).
After the encapsulation of the fuel, a lid is welded onto the 
canister by FSW. A rotating tool is plunged between the 
Figure 2. Copper canisters dimensions.
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pieces to be welded and makes the material plastic by the 
heat generated with the friction. During the tool movement 
the two surfaces are stirred together and a  joint is real­
ized [11]. The weld joint design includes a gap between the 
lid and the canister. This gap represents a discontinuity in 
the material, detectable by an ultrasonic transducer placed 
beneath the welding line (Figure 3).
The amplitude response acquired by the ultrasonic testing 
around the circumference of the welded canister could be 
used as a fingerprint, unique and different to each canister.
Before the evaluation of the amplitude response of the weld­
ing area of a full scale copper canister, preliminary studies 
were carried out on copper flanges, i.e. slices of the copper 
lid already welded onto the tube. The first tests implement­
ed by the manual displacement of a contact transducer 
(V111­RM Fingertip Contact Transducers ­ Panametrics) re­
vealed a series of fingerprints such as those illustrated in 
Figure 4. The probe is moved along arcs 380 mm wide po­
sitioned at different heights (h=25, 23, 21, 19, 17, 15 mm) 
from the bottom surface of the lid (see Figure 3).
Figure 3. Position of the ultrasonic transducer for the investigation 
of the gap between copper lid and tube.
The variation of the ultrasonic amplitude echo is more 
marked at h=15 mm where the gap is clearly detectable. 
Moving the probe at higher positions the amplitude of the 
received echo is lower. This means that the gap is disap­
pearing from the focus of the probe and the interface be­
tween lid and tube is perfectly welded. As a  conse­
quence, the presence of a discontinuity in the material 
detectable by ultrasounds is demonstrated. However, it is 
important to remember that flanges are just laboratory 
samples and that the variation of patterns in a real canis­
ter coming from a production­like process could be low­
er. Therefore experimental tests on full scale lids already 
welded onto tubes must be implemented to verify the ac­
curacy and repeatability of the method. For this purpose, 
the manual scanning of the sample is replaced by a read­
er prototype hosting a motor for an automated scanning. 
The description of this new system called IDA reader is 
reported in the following paragraph.
2.2 The IDA Reader
The IDA (IDentification and Authentication) reader is a de­
vice for the identification and authentication of copper 
canisters. The first prototype realized is only dedicated to 
the acquisition of an authentication fingerprint. The sys­
tem is composed by a reader, a control box and a com­
puter (Figure 5). The reader consists of three supporting 
arms made on steel, centred on the lid, and a motor de­
voted to the rotation of a rod holding the ultrasonic trans­
ducer (Olympus V311 with 10 MHz central frequency and 
8.4 inches spherical focused). The probe is kept perpen­
dicular to the lid surface and its distance can be adjusted 
from 50 mm to 25 mm, while height (h) from 35 mm to 
14 mm from the bottom of the lid. The box hosts an elec­
tronic board connected to an US­Key module (Lecoeur 
Electronique) controlling the motor’s rotation and the 
transmission/reception of the ultrasonic signal. Lastly the 
Figure 4. Relative amplitude responses of the internal gap between copper lid and tube.
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computer displays the software interface for the setting 
of testing parameters and the signal processing.
Figure 5. IDA reader prototype.
The software interface is composed by four different tabs. 
The first tab allows the setting of the main measurements 
parameters and the three gates (time windows) of interest, 
where echoes are expected. The second and third tabs 
are then focused on the acquisition of the internal gap fin­
gerprints. The last part is centralized on the signal pro­
cessing. In particular, the correlation index between two 
fingerprints selected from the database can be calculated 
and the two curves can be displayed shifted and over­
lapped on a chart.
The first test of the reader is carried out at the SILab facili­
ty on copper flanges arranged around a circumference re­
producing the same geometry of a real copper lid welded 
on a tube. The three arms of the reader should be perfect­
ly parallel to the bottom of the lid to keep the probe per­
pendicular to copper interface during revolution. The scan 
time is roughly 4 minutes, corresponding to a 360° rotation 
of the probe around the circumference. Before starting 
with tests, the temperature of water is measured through 
an infrared digital thermometer and the probe distance 
and height are set by a calliper. Depending on temperature 
and probe position, different time windows shall be settled 
in the acquisition software to ensure a good reception of 
the ultrasonic echoes. The set­up of measurements is 
shown in Figure 6.
Several tests were carried out changing the angular posi­
tion of the reader’s arms above flanges and the analysis of 
acquired echoes revealed a very high correlation between 
fingerprints, whether acquired without changing the set­up 
or adjusting the reader positions above flanges.
Figure 6. Set­up of measurements.
3. The experimental testing
The experimental testing of the ultrasonic method for 
the authentication of copper canisters was done by the 
ultrasonic investigation of two copper lids already weld­
ed onto tubes at the SKB’s Canister Laboratory. The 
aim of these inspections was to verify the detectability 
of a fluctuating fingerprint due to variations in the mate­
rial after welding. Moreover, the repeatability of the 
method should be confirmed by the high correlation in­
dexes between multiple acquisitions with the IDA read­
er. This chapter describes all the measurements imple­
mented and their results.
3.1  The ultrasonic testing at the SKB’s Canister 
laboratory
The SKB’s Canister Laboratory, situated in Oskarshamn’s 
port, is the centre for the development of technologies that 
will be used for the encapsulation of spent fuel in copper 
canisters. The laboratory houses the SKB’s prototype of 
the welding machine, manufactured by ESAB and used for 
the FWS of the lids to the canisters [12].
The ultrasonic inspections with IDA Reader were carried 
out on two samples of copper lids already welded onto 
tubes (FSWL 121 and FSWL 122). The geometries of the 
two original lids were slightly dif ferent therefore the 
uniqueness of fingerprints could not be checked. How­
ever comparisons between received echoes are useful 
to evaluate the efficacy of the ultrasonic method. Cop­
per samples are placed in a tank with water (Figure 7) 
and four labels are arranged at 90° from each other on 
the upper surface of the lid to create a reference pattern 
for measures.
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Figure 7. Experimental testing of the IDA reader at the SKB’s 
Canister Laboratory.
In this way, different acquisitions are carried out changing 
the arms positions around the circumference. The series 
of measurements implemented is shown in Figure 8. For 
each position A, B, C, D, the height of the transducer is 
changed from 15 mm to 21 mm with a  step of 2 mm. 
Through the variation of the reader position, it is possible 
to verify the reader ability to perform repeatable measure­
ments. The adjustment of probe heights, instead, aims to 
detect which is the variation of the ultrasonic amplitude re­
sponse in the entire welding area.
3.2 Analysis of results
The analysis of the data acquired during the ultrasonic in­
vestigations is presented in this paragraph. The most 
meaningful fingerprints are reported and compared to 
identify the main features. The first result illustrated con­
cerns the investigation of the FSWL 122 at 15 mm of probe 
height. The temperature of water during the test was 18°C, 
the probe distance 50 mm and the gain of the electronic 
receiver was 37 dB. The chart below (Figure 9) shows the 
ultrasonic amplitude response related to two different 
gates (gate 2: 82­97µs and gate 3: 102­117 µs), on 360° of 
the lid circumference. The signal in blue is the amplitude 
response due to the reflection on the internal gap. In pur­
ple, instead, it is shown the double reflection of the previ­
ous signal that is temporally located at the same time win­
dows than the external wall echo (because thicknesses of 
tube and lid in this region are both 50 mm). The vertical 
line in red marks the starting point of the weld (the entry 
point of the welding tool).
Figure 8. Sequence of measurements implemented on copper samples.
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Figure 9. Ultrasonic amplitude response of FSWL 122 at 15 mm height.
Figure 10. Inspection simulation implemented by CIVA software for the verification of the time of flight of the double reflection on the in­
ternal gap.
The variation of the signal could be related to the different 
grain size in the material that generates a different attenua­
tion pattern around the lid circumference. Several meas­
urements are implemented changing the position of the 
reader above the sample and the correlation between dif­
ferent acquisitions is high. Therefore the repeatability of 
signatures is verified and signals are stable if we consider 
a constant water temperature, even though influence of 
water temperature can be easily compensated.
In order to verify that the echo in purple was exactly the 
repetition of the first in blue, an inspection simulation 
with CIVA software is implemented (Figure 10). As a re­
sult, the simulated A­signal exhibit three main echoes: 
the first related to the interface water/copper, the second 
due to the reflection on the internal gap (corresponding 
to the blue trace) and then a second reflection whose 
features (amplitude and time of flight) agrees with our re­
sults (purple trace).
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Figure 11. Ultrasonic amplitude response of FSWL 122 at 19 mm height.
The probe is then moved at height 17 mm, 19 mm and 
21 mm. The next picture (Figure 11) shows the ultrasonic 
investigation of the lid at 19 mm of height. This time in blue 
is reported the amplitude response of gate 2 due to the in­
ternal gap reflection and in red the amplitude response of 
gate 3 that corresponds to the external wall echo. In fact, 
when the weld joint is perfect, ultrasounds can penetrate 
in the material without reflection up to the last interface 
that is the external wall of the canister. As shown in the 
chart, when the external wall gives a high echo, the inter­
nal gap echo is practically zero (green area). The inversion 
of signals interests an arc of about 100º.
It is interesting to underline the presence of another signal in­
version, highlighted in yellow, which could correspond to the 
point where the welding tool passes two times during the 
welding process. According to Figure 12, in fact, only when all 
the parameters are stable, the tool descends at the welding 
line level and starts the weld (point 4). After 360°, it passes by 
the starting point and then return back (point 5). This hypoth­
esis is also in accordance with the position of the entry point 
(vertical red line in the chart) of the welding tool.
Figure 12. Welding tool rotation and sequences in the welding 
cycle: 1) acceleration sequence, 2) downward sequence, 3) joint 
line welding, 4) overlap sequence and 5) parking sequence.
The ultrasonic investigation of the second sample, 
FSWL 121, generated similar results. In particular Figure 13 
reports the internal gap echo and the external wall echo 
received by the transducer placed at 21 mm of height. As 
the previous case, an inversion of signals is clearly detect­
able (yellow area) and probably represents the crossing 
point of the welding tool (point 4 in Figure 12).
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FSWL 121 FSWL 122
h=15mm h=17mm h=19mm h=21mm h=15mm h=17mm h=19mm h=21mm
Correlation 
indexes 
between 
different 
acquisitions
0.96 0.80 0.65 0.66 0.80 0.92 0.96 0.81
0.97 0.79 0.80 0.75 0.64 0.92 0.88 0.72
0.95 0.82 0.62 0.47 0.89 0.97 0.87 0.78
0.95 0.83 0.99 0.79 0.88 0.97 0.83 0.81
0.96 0.98 0.75 0.67 0.93 0.95 1.00 0.92
0.96 0.80 0.86 0.68 0.83 0.91 0.97 0.84
0.98 0.61 0.63 0.47 0.71 0.90 0.89 0.97
Average value 0.96 0.80 0.76 0.64 0.81 0.93 0.91 0.84
Table 1. Correlation indexes between acquisitions at 15­17­19­21 mm of height.
Figure 13. Ultrasonic amplitude response of FSWL 121 at 21 mm height.
Following the analysis of echoes at different heights, fin­
gerprints are compared to verify the repeatability of meas­
ures. The Pearson’s correlation coefficient is calculated 
between acquisitions carried out at the same height. The 
resulting values of correlation indexes are collected in Ta­
ble 1, and the average value for each height is evaluated. 
Results put in evidence that the IDA reader is able to ac­
quire ultrasonic signals with a good precision because 
correlation indexes are higher than 0.8 in most of the cas­
es. However for FSWL 121, measurements acquired at 
19 mm and 21 mm present lower values, probably due to 
an incorrect fixing of the rod holding the transducer.
4. Conclusions
The identification and authentication of copper canisters is 
of upmost importance to guarantee the Continuity of Knowl­
edge of spent nuclear fuel during transport, storage and 
deposition in the geological repository. In the past, different 
technologies were assessed for the labelling of spent fuel 
casks and, among them, ultrasonic systems would be the 
best option [13]. The SILab of the Joint Research Centre in 
Ispra developed an ultrasonic method for copper canister 
identification and authentication. The identification could be 
realized by the machining of chamfers on the inner surface 
of the lid, forming a unique code readable by an ultrasonic 
transducer immerged in water, rotating around the lid cir­
cumference. The authentication, instead, could be verified 
by the ultrasonic inspection of the welding area between lid 
and tube after Friction Stir Welding. Following the descrip­
tion of the authentication method, this paper reports the ex­
perimental tests carried out at the SKB’s Canister Laborato­
ry in Oskarshamn. For this purpose, a new reader prototype 
called IDA reader is developed. The fingerprints acquired 
during the visit in Sweden are then analysed and compared. 
The analysis of signals revealed a quite marked variation of 
the amplitude of the internal gap echo. The uniqueness of 
fingerprints could not be verified because of the differences 
in copper lids geometries; however several featured points 
were identified on fingerprints. Moreover, the repeatability of 
fingerprints is proved by making different tests on the same 
samples. Nevertheless, additional inspections on final weld­
ed copper samples with the selected geometry of the lid 
must be carried out in order to verify uniqueness and identi­
fy distinctive features on welding areas. Meanwhile, the ul­
trasonic method will be presented to international safe­
guards authorities which would give their feedback on the 
proposed solution.
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Abstract:
At the Olkiluoto repository site, the operator Posiva Oy runs 
a  multidisciplinary monitoring programme targeted at 
studying environmental impact, improving the understanding 
of the natural properties of the site, verifying favourable 
conditions for long-term safety, and developing methods for 
monitoring the performance of engineered barriers. The 
usability of the data produced by the monitoring programme 
for the implementation of nuclear safeguards is assessed, 
primarily to detect the excavation of any undeclared 
underground premises.
Microseismic monitoring is currently the only method whose 
results, located seismic events in Olk i luoto and 
surroundings, are already used in implementing national 
safeguards. It is concluded that automatic hydraulic head 
measurements in deep drillholes and land use monitoring 
also produce relevant data and findings for safeguards 
purposes.
Hydraulic head is monitored in several drillholes that 
penetrate the rock volume where the repository will be 
excavated. These holes are divided into sections, so that 
head can be measured separately at different depths. The 
monitored sections are often situated in hydrogeological 
zones, where fractures in the crystalline bedrock allow 
groundwater to flow significantly more freely than elsewhere. 
In some of these zones, a groundwater leak into a new 
tunnel or drillhole gives rise to a significant decrease of 
hydraulic head at such a large distance that it can be readily 
detected in several monitoring sections.
Monitoring of land use is based on aerial photographs and 
maintaining a land use record. These sources are used to 
regularly update a  land use grid covering the whole of 
Olkiluoto. The aerial photographs and land use grid can 
supplement other imagery used to verify the declaration of 
surface constructions.
The inclusion of the results of hydraulic head and land use 
monitoring in the input for the implementation of national 
safeguards could apparently be achieved by examining 
material and reports that Posiva already delivers for other 
purposes. The IAEA can use these reports as open source 
information.
Keywords: monitoring; repository; safeguards; seismicity; 
hydrogeology
1. Introduction
Monitoring is required to be performed at a repository as 
recommended in IAEA TECDOC 1208 [1], and required by 
STUK Regulatory Guide YVL D.5 [2]. Therefore, Posiva Oy, 
the company responsible of the final deposition project for 
the spent nuclear fuel in Finland, has been running an ex­
tensive multi­disciplinary monitoring programme at the 
Olkiluoto repository site. The aims include studying the im­
pact for the repository project on the environment, improv­
ing the understanding of the conditions at the site, and 
supporting the analysis of the long­term safety of the 
repository.
Before applying for the nuclear construction licence Posiva 
has constructed an underground rock characterization fa­
cility called the ONKALO at the Olkiluoto repository site. It 
extends to the planned repository depth of about 
430 m and includes an access ramp, shafts and technical 
underground rooms that will eventually also serve as the 
actual repository. Figure 1 shows the repository site of 
Olkiluoto, the horizontal extent of the ONKALO in 2017, 
drillholes and other monitoring points, and in an insert, the 
location of the site in Finland.
In this article, we discuss the usability of the monitoring 
programme for implementing national nuclear safeguards 
at the Olkiluoto site during the construction phase and, as 
regards detecting undeclared excavation, also during the 
operational phase. The implementation of nuclear safe­
guards in an underground repository for spent nuclear fuel 
mainly concerns the verification of two issues: first, that 
the construction of underground facilities corresponds to 
the reported, declared and licenced design, and second, 
that full accountability for all nuclear material is maintained 
in the process of transport, encapsulation and final depo­
sition of spent nuclear fuel or any other nuclear material. 
Of these two issues, the monitoring programme mainly 
contributes to the first one, because the surveillance of the 
operation of the facility is not within its scope. The interna­
tional safeguards requires the declaration of the Design In­
formation, i.e., the layout of the site and the fuel transfer 
routes per Safeguards Agreement, and according to the 
Additional Protocol also the buildings, i.e., volumes of un­
derground rooms, but not the monitoring of the stability of 
the buildings, rooms or premises. These issues have been 
addressed by the IAEA Expert’s Group SAGOR / ASTOR 
when developing generic safeguards approaches in the 
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SAGOR phase [3] and identifying potential technologies for 
safeguarding geological repositories [4]. The safeguards­
safety interface was indicated already by the SAGOR 
group [5], but the use of operator’s data and safety analy­
sis instead of independent verification has been an obsta­
cle for the IAEA to apply the these methods and data avail­
able at the repository site.
The operator Posiva runs a safeguards programme since 
the early stages of the site investigations and the excava­
tion of the ONKALO. Under that programme, the design 
information is generated e.g. by laser­scanning and main­
tained in the safeguards­by­design process, and site dec­
larations are updated for the IAEA verification. In addition, 
detected microseismic events in Olkiluoto have been regu­
larly reported to STUK as the contribution of the monitor­
ing programme to national safeguards implementation. 
The monitoring results can be used to generate state find­
ings to be ascertained by the IAEA according to the Safe­
guards Agreement, and moreover, the public results can 
be included in the IAEA data analytics and in included in 
the state­level evaluation on the fuel cycle­related 
activities.
The aim of this study is not to develop a independent veri­
fication methods for the IAEA, but to facilitate its and in 
particular STUK’s safeguards assessment by increasing 
Olkiluoto site understanding using all information available 
as proposed already in 2006 [6]. The geoscientific moni­
toring programme at the Olkiluoto repository site was 
updated in 2016. Therefore the reassessment of its safe­
guards relevance was carried out in 2017 [7].
2.  Monitoring programme and its potential 
in safeguards implementation
Olkiluoto Monitoring Programme (in Finnish: Olkiluodon 
monitorointiohjelma, OMO) has formally existed since 2004 
[8], when Posiva started the excavation of the ONKALO, 
although some of the measurements were started more 
than a  decade earlier. The programme has gradually 
evolved over time on the basis of experience gathered and 
changes in the needs for research. An updated pro­
gramme was introduced in 2012 [9] and in 2016, some fur­
ther adjustments were made and the duration of the pro­
gramme extended to include the years 2017–2019 by 
publishing separate updating memos for the six sub­pro­
grammes or disciplines: rock mechanics [10], hydrology 
and hydrogeology [11], hydrogeochemistry [12], surface 
environment [13], engineered barrier system [14], and for­
eign materials [15].
2.1 Rock mechanics monitoring
Rock mechanics monitoring concentrates on the assess­
ment of tectonic movement and bedrock stability in Olki­
luoto and the surrounding area. For the most recent annu­
al monitoring report on rock mechanics, see Haapalehto 
et al. [16]. Table 1 presents the two methods in the pro­
gramme that are assessed relevant for the implementation 
Figure 1. Aerial photograph of the Olkiluoto repository site with drillholes and other monitoring points. The surface projections of deep “KR” 
drillholes are shown as black curves. Grid size 1 km. Insert in the upper left­hand­side corner presents the location of Olkiluoto in Finland.
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Process Method Location Frequency
Relevance to 
safeguards
Seismicity, reactivation of 
bedrock structures
Microseismic monitoring 18 automatic stations Continuous Located seismic events 
indicate excavation by 
blasting
Thermal evolution Monitoring of 
temperature
Temperature profiles in 
drillholes
During geophysical and 
flow loggings
Anomaly in temperature 
profile may indicate open 
space near the drillhole
Table 1. Targets of rock mechanics monitoring assessed relevant for safeguards.
of safeguards. The first one, microseismic monitoring, is 
currently the only part of the monitoring programme whose 
results Posiva submits for safeguard purposes. In addition 
to the methods in the table, rock mechanics monitoring in­
cludes a number of studies that are not considered rele­
vant for safeguards. The tectonic movement of bedrock is 
monitored by GPS measurements of the relative positions 
of fixed pillars, and the post­glacial isostatic uplift by pre­
cise levelling. In the underground premises, the stability of 
the excavated rock is monitored by visual observation of 
spalling and by using extensometry to investigate rock 
stress redistribution in newly excavated spaces and the 
possible reactivation of bedrock structures at fracture zone 
intersections. Tunnel air temperature is also continuously 
monitored.
Microseismic monitoring is actually aimed at studying nat­
ural seismicity and detecting any activation of bedrock 
fractures that the construction of the repository may in­
duce. However, the bulk of the recorded events are blasts 
from excavation. The events can be located with sufficient 
spatial accuracy to ensure that they are related to the li­
cenced construction. As an example of microseismic 
monitoring data accumulated during one year, Figure 2 
presents the seismic events detected in 2010 within the 
seismic “ONKALO block”, a 2 km × 2 km × 2 km cube 
surrounding the repository. Most of the events were blasts 
related to the excavation of the lowest straight section of 
the access ramp; the marks are coloured on the basis of 
time, so that the progress of excavation is clearly visible. 
There also occurred seismic events on or near the ground 
surface that were associated with construction of pipelines 
and buildings.
Experience from the time of the excavation of ONKALO 
has proven that microseismic monitoring is able to detect 
tunnelling by blasting reliably and accurately. Sensitivity to 
excavation by boring has also been demonstrated by Saari 
and Malm [17], as well as the ability to distinguish simulta­
neous blasting at an undeclared location from declared 
excavation. The obvious advantages of microseismic mon­
itoring in detecting clandestine tunnelling are that, firstly, it 
covers the entire volume of host rock between and beyond 
the network of drillholes and other monitoring locations, 
and secondly, that blasts are detected immediately. On the 
other hand, because of the large sampling frequency of 
seismic sensors, the measurement data cannot be stored 
as a continuous time series, but the measuring stations 
are programmed to store and transmit only the sequences 
of data where a seismic event occurs according to certain 
triggering criteria.
Figure 2. Microseismic events detected near the ONKALO in 
2010 [13]. Grid size is 100 m ×100 m and the colour scale indi­
cates time of the event from January (blue) to December (red). The 
ONKALO access ramp and shafts are shown in orange.
The second method of rock mechanics monitoring that is 
assessed to have relevance to safeguards is the monitor­
ing of thermal evolution of bedrock by temperature meas­
urements in drillholes. This assessment is based on the 
observation of Johansson et al. [19] that the excavation of 
the tunnel has affected the temperature profiles measured 
in a deep characterisation drillhole. In the temperature pro­
file acquired in 2015, there are two clearly observable 
anomalies at depths where the access ramp passes the 
drillhole at distances of about 20 and 35 metres. The ex­
cavation reached these closest points in March 2009 and 
May 2010, so that the observed temperature effect has 
taken 5–6 years to develop. Although this demonstrates 
that thermal monitoring can potentially detect unknown 
tunnels, the method is evidently very slow and uncertain 
for the following reasons: the tunnel has to pass a drillhole 
relatively closely, it takes a long time before the existence 
of the tunnel alters the temperature of the surrounding 
rock mass sufficiently for detection (depends on distance 
but typically order of years), and temperature profile meas­
urements are not carried out systematically in all drillholes 
but only in those that are selected, by other criteria, for 
groundwater flow logging.
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2.2 Hydrological and hydrogeological monitoring
Hydrological and hydrogeological monitoring comprises of 
studies of groundwater level, hydraulic properties of the 
bedrock and overburden, hydraulic head and flow of 
groundwater in the bedrock, inflow into tunnels, and the in­
fluence of the Korvensuo Reservoir, the only remarkable 
body of surface water in Olkiluoto. For the most recent an­
nual monitoring report on hydrology and hydrogeology, see 
Vaittinen et al. [20]. Of all the related measurements, only 
the automatic monitoring of hydraulic head of groundwater 
in packed­off deep drillholes, and the analysis of pressure 
responses in the head data, are assessed relevant for the 
implementation of safeguards (see Table 2). Hydraulic head 
is a quantity used in hydrogeology to express groundwater 
pressure, equal to the elevation of the (real or theoretical) 
surface of a column of water connected to the groundwater 
system. It is more practical than the actual pressure be­
cause it is the gradient of head, not of pressure, that deter­
mines the flow velocity of groundwater.
In addition to hydraulic head monitoring, some other methods 
of hydrogeological monitoring can also yield indications of ex­
cavation or construction on ground surface, but with such 
uncertainty and long delay that their relevance to the imple­
mentation of safeguards is merely hypothetical. These meth­
ods include the monitoring of groundwater level in shallow 
drillholes and groundwater observation tubes, and the moni­
toring of groundwater flow and hydraulic properties in deep 
drillholes by flow logging. In a few cases during the construc­
tion of the ONKALO, earthwork on the surface and tunnel ex­
cavation have affected groundwater level to an observable 
extent, but with a delay and at a short range only, so that the 
activity has evidently been first observed visually.
Hydraulic head is monitored in most of the almost 60 deep 
(up to a depth of 1 km) characterization drillholes in Olkiluo­
to. To enable head monitoring and to prevent artificial hy­
draulic connections in the vertical direction, the drillholes 
have been packed­off, in other words equipped with a set 
of inflatable packers that divide the drillhole into hydraulically 
isolated sections. A maximum of eight packer sections in 
one drillhole can be connected to the top of the drillhole 
with a hose so that the water level in the hose and, there­
fore, the hydraulic head in the section can be measured. 
Hydraulic head data together with results on groundwater 
flow and hydraulic conductivity are used to study the effect 
of  excavat ion on the groundwater system, in 
hydrogeological modelling of Olkiluoto, and in the interpreta­
tion of hydrogeochemical observations.
The ability of hydraulic head monitoring to detect tunnel exca­
vation and other underground activity results from the reposi­
tory being constructed in crystalline bedrock, where fracturing 
and thus also hydraulic conductivity is concentrated in defor­
mation zones that have formed during the geological evolution 
of Olkiluoto. For a detailed description of the geology of the 
site, see Aaltonen et al. [21]. The data on the geology and hy­
drogeology of Olkiluoto, gathered by various methods includ­
ing monitoring measurements, has been used to compile 
a hydrogeological structure model of the site [22]. It describes 
the hydraulic properties of the bedrock with approximately 
planar hydrogeological zones, along which groundwater is 
able to flow significantly more easily than in the rock volumes 
in between. Figure 3 presents a 3D visualisation of the current 
hydrogeological structure model of the Olkiluoto area. Moni­
toring of hydraulic head mostly concentrates on the modelled 
zones, because they are essential for both the planning and 
the long­term safety analysis of the repository.
Figure 3. Visualisation of the hydrogeological structure model of 
Olkiluoto. Coloured polygons represent hydrogeological zones 
(HZ+number) or brittle deformation zones (BFZ+number), the thick 
grey line the shoreline of Olkiluoto, and thin black lines deep drill­
holes. View from the south­west.
The sensitivity of hydraulic head monitoring to excavation is 
most clearly demonstrated by data from the time when the 
construction of the ramp reached the hydrogeological HZ20 
system, consisting of zones HZ20A and HZ20B of the struc­
ture model, in the summer of 2008. Figure 4 shows these 
zones, the ONKALO in the extent in 2017, and some of the 
Process Method Location Frequency
Relevance to 
safeguards
Evolution  
of hydraulic head
Hydraulic head 
monitoring
Packed­off surface drillholes 
and ONKALO drillholes
Hourly Detects tunnel excavation in 
case it causes a change in 
the flow of groundwater 
from a monitored hydrogeo­
logical structure.
Analysis of pressure 
responses
Hydraulic head data During geophysical and 
flow loggings
Table 2. Targets of hydrogeological monitoring assessed relevant for safeguards.
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drillholes with hydraulic head monitoring sections. Before 
blasting through the zone, a core­drilled pilot hole was made 
into the planned tunnel profile for investigations. The pilot hole 
penetrated the HZ20 system, causing a leak that lasted for 
over two weeks. Figure 5 presents a plot of the change of hy­
draulic head during the leak in selected monitoring sections 
of drillholes intersecting the HZ20 system. The largest head 
response occurred in section L4 of drillhole OL­KR4, which 
lies only a few dozen metres from the leaking point. The inter­
ruption in the data from that section, as well as the almost as 
strongly affected L2 of OL­KR22, results from the water level 
in the measuring hoses in the drillholes falling below the pres­
sure sensor. Uninterrupted data exists from section L2 of OL­
KR25 (230 m from the leaking point), where the head de­
creased by about 8.5 m before the leak stopped. In other 
monitored drillhole sections in the HZ20 zone, the response 
decreases with distance still being about 1 m in section L8 of 
OL­KR5, which lies about 900 m to the north­west of the leak 
point, and 1.6 m in L1 of OL­KR44, 1,000 m to the east.
Figure 4. 3D illustration of the ONKALO (grey), hydrogeological 
zones HZ20A (purple) and HZ20B (blue), and some head monitor­
ing sections of drillholes where responses to the leaks discussed 
in the text were detected. The drillholes are presented with black 
lines and the selected monitoring sections with thick blue lines. 
The spiralling access tunnel is about 5 km long and reaches the 
depth of 450 m from ground surface. View from the south.
Figure 5. Change of hydraulic head in some monitored drillhole 
sections during a  leak from a  pilot hole intersecting the HZ20 
structure. The vertical green and red lines mark the beginning and 
end of the leak, respectively. Drillhole section labels consist of 
a  drillhole code (KR+number), section code (L+number), and 
range of drillhole length in metres.
The second example is also related to the HZ20 system. In 
July 2009, as a preparation for the raise boring of one of 
the vertical shafts, grouting holes were drilled at the level 
of zone HZ20. During a leak from one of the holes, head 
changes graphed in Figure 6 occurred. In about 12 hours, 
head decreased by almost 20 m in drillhole sections L3 of 
OL­KR4, L2 of OL­KR25, and L1 of OL­KR22. The re­
sponse was much smaller or zero in other sections of the 
same drillholes, demonstrating how hydraulic effects prop­
agate significantly better along the hydrogeological zones 
than in other directions.
Figure 6. Change of hydraulic head in some monitored drillhole 
sections during a leak from a shaft grouting hole intersecting the 
HZ20 structure. The vertical green and red lines mark the begin­
ning and end of the leak, respectively. Drillhole section labels con­
sist of drillhole code (KR+number), section code (L+number), and 
range of drillhole length in metres.
During the excavation of the ramp, dozens of responses to 
temporary groundwater leaks, similar to the two examples 
presented here, have been observed. Most of them have 
been mediated by zones HZ19 and HZ20. Moreover, in 
a number of monitored drillhole sections, a  long­term 
drawdown (decrease of head) has developed due to hy­
draulic connections to the underground premises. On the 
basis of this experience, hydraulic head monitoring data is 
sensitive to tunnelling in the repository site. When excava­
tion or drilling intersects a major hydrogeological zone or 
a local hydraulically conductive feature, groundwater pres­
sure is inevitably affected, and the effect propagates to 
distances of hundreds of meters in a matter of hours. Ad­
vantages in comparison with microseismic monitoring are, 
firstly, that continuous monitoring data is automatically 
stored from all operational sensors and, secondly, that the 
effect of excavation is not instantaneous but usually lasts 
for at least a couple of days even if the leak itself is quickly 
stopped. Therefore, missing a signal because of failed trig­
gering of the measurement system is not possible. On the 
other hand, there are the evident limitations that, firstly, 
a response can usually only be observed if the tunnel or 
drillhole penetrates a hydrogeological zone that also inter­
sects monitored drillhole sections, and secondly, the exact 
location of the leak causing the head decrease cannot be 
determined from the data because of the heterogeneity of 
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the structures mediating the effect. However, a rough esti­
mate of the location can be deduced if the same effect is 
observed in more than one monitoring section.
2.3 Hydrogeochemical monitoring
Hydrogeochemical monitoring studies the evolution of 
groundwater properties and salinity distribution both in the 
overburden and deep in the bedrock. The principal meth­
od is taking and analysing groundwater samples from vari­
ous targets. Some simple chemical parameters are also 
monitored continuously in situ, for example pH and con­
ductivity of groundwater leaking into the tunnel. Issues of 
interest range from the natural chemical and microbiologi­
cal properties of groundwater in the repository site to hu­
man influence due to foreign materials used underground. 
For the most recent annual monitoring report on hydroge­
ochemistry, see Lamminmäki et al. [23].
It is, in principle, conceivable that undeclared tunnel exca­
vation or construction on the surface would give rise to de­
tectable changes in groundwater chemistry by disturbing 
groundwater flow and introducing foreign substances. 
However, such effects are likely to be slow, limited in 
range, and ambiguous to interpret. The relevance of all ge­
ochemical monitoring to the implementation of safeguards 
is thus hypothetical at best.
2.4 Monitoring of the surface environment
Monitoring of the surface environment includes long­term 
investigations to acquire site­specific input data for bio­
sphere modelling, research of the interaction between sur­
face environment and groundwater, and studies of the en­
vironmental impact of the final disposal project. Moreover, 
radiological studies aimed at establishing a baseline for the 
future monitoring of radioactive releases from the disposal 
facility have been part of the programme, but in the 2016 
update, they were organized into a separate project. For 
the most recent annual monitoring report on surface envi­
ronment, see Pere et al. [24].
Among the studies of surface environment, the monitoring 
of land use is assessed relevant to the implementation of 
safeguards (see Table 3). It involves aerial photographs 
taken every other year, keeping record of changes in infra­
structure and other land use, and maintaining a land use 
grid describing the principal use of every 50 m  × 
50 m square of Olkiluoto. All these data are useful for 
supplementing the present material used to verify Posiva’s 
design information and site declaration.
Some targets of the monitoring of surface environment 
have hypothetical but no practical relevance to safeguards: 
noise measurements or the chemical monitoring of a sedi­
mentation pool containing process water pumped from 
the underground premises and of ditches that lead waters 
from the construction site and rock spoil piling area to the 
sea could, in principle, reveal undeclared activity, but simi­
larly with the hydrogeochemical monitoring discussed 
above, with high uncertainty and in an ambiguous way. 
The rest of the targets, like studies on the quality of sea 
and drainage water, recording forest and aquatic manage­
ment activities, monitoring surface hydrology and meteor­
ology, and evaluating the impact on exploitable natural re­
sources, have no relevance to safeguards.
2.5 Monitoring of the engineered barriers
In the KBS­3V [25] final deposition concept that Posiva 
plans to implement, the spent nuclear fuel is encapsulated 
in the original fuel elements into cylindrical canisters with 
a copper casing surrounding a cast iron interior. After em­
placement into vertical deposition holes, the canisters are 
surrounded with a buffer of bentonite clay blocks, and fi­
nally the tunnels are backfilled with bentonite, and tunnel 
openings and drillholes are closed with various plugs and 
seals. The canister, bentonite buffer, and tunnel backfill 
constitute the “engineered barrier system” (EBS) that to­
gether with the natural barrier of bedrock is intended to 
ensure containment of the deposited radioactive material, 
protection against external disturbances, and retention 
and retardation of any releases. Posiva’s monitoring pro­
gramme includes a separate discipline for EBS monitoring, 
which is still in the development stage. Therefore, EBS 
monitoring does not currently produce results relevant for 
the implementation of nuclear safeguards.
3. Summary and conclusions
This article discusses the Olkiluoto Monitoring Programme 
and its potential in implementing nuclear safeguards on the 
disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel that Posiva Oy is con­
structing in Olkiluoto, Finland. A systematic assessment of 
each monitoring method leads to the conclusion that three 
of them produce safeguards­relevant results: microseismic 
monitoring, automatic hydraulic head monitoring in deep 
Motivation Subject Target/method Frequency Relevance to safeguards
Interaction between 
surface environment and 
groundwater in bedrock
Land use Aerial photographs Every other year Can supplement present 
satellite imaging
Records of changes in infra­
structure and other land use
Continuous Can supplement present 
accounting of surface facilities
Update of land use grid Next 2018
Table 3. Targets of monitoring of surface environment assessed relevant for safeguards.
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drillholes, and land use monitoring. In addition, some meth­
ods can, in principle, indicate surface excavation or tunnel­
ling, but only at a short distance (if at all) and after the activi­
ty would already have been detected visually.
Results of microseismic monitoring, i.e. the detected and lo­
cated seismic events in Olkiluoto and the surrounding re­
gion are reported to the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safe­
ty Authority (STUK) for safeguards assessment since the 
early stages of the excavation of the repository. This method 
of monitoring has proven to accurately detect blasts from 
underground excavation as well as on the surface.
Automatic hydraulic head (groundwater pressure) monitor­
ing acquires hourly data from over 200 packer sections of 
deep drillholes in Olkiluoto. A significant share of the moni­
tored sections have been positioned in sub­horizontal hy­
drogeological zones, where pressure variations, caused by 
groundwater leaking from the zone into drilled holes or ex­
cavated spaces, have been observed to spread over long 
distances. Therefore, hydraulic head monitoring, has po­
tential to reveal clandestine tunnelling or drilling from the 
ground surface towards the depth of the disposal facility.
The advantages of the hydraulic head monitoring include 
sensitivity to all methods of excavation in contrast to mi­
croseismic monitoring that can reliably only detect blast­
ing. Moreover, the effects on head that can reveal under­
ground activity are long­lasting or even irreversible, so the 
probability of missing a significant signal is low. The most 
obvious disadvantages are that the source of the signal 
cannot be located with the same accuracy as in microseis­
mic monitoring, and that the method is sensitive only to 
activities within the hydraulically conductive zones. Posiva 
already reports interpreted results of hydraulic head moni­
toring regularly for the supervision of the construction and 
long­term safety of the disposal facility. Thus, this informa­
tion could with relative ease be taken into account in the 
implementation of nuclear safeguards.
The monitoring of land use in Olkiluoto involves aerial pho­
tography and updating a land use grid every second year. 
These results, if reported to STUK for safeguards purpos­
es, can be used to supplement other aerial or satellite im­
agery of the Olkiluoto site in verifying the declared surface 
constructions and activities. The monitoring reports are 
published and thus these can be used by the IAEA as 
open source information when analysing the nuclear fuel 
cycle­related activities in Finland.
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Abstract:
This paper presents an outline of a proposed Swedish 
encapsulation and deposition system for spent nuclear 
fuel, possible national measures in support of international 
safeguards, and possible national measures implemented 
for domestic purposes. All these measures are only in 
support of nuclear material accountancy and are not in 
any way aimed at other scenarios that would be in 
violation of Swedish law, e.g., theft, falsification, sabotage, 
etc. Only the operational phase of the geological 
repository is considered in this paper.
The IAEA has developed safeguards approaches under 
integrated safeguards for encapsulation plants and geological 
repositories. The approaches are very generic for these two 
facility types and cannot be used for devising detailed 
safeguards approaches. In this context, a  compatibility 
evaluation of the generic IAEA approaches vis-à-vis the 
proposed Swedish system has been conducted. This 
evaluation also takes into account the conclusion drawn 
under the Additional Protocol, i.e., the confirmed State-wide 
absence of undeclared nuclear activities.
Two elements of the proposed Swedish system that will 
need careful consideration are: (1) the high throughput 
encapsulation process–which may limit the time available 
for safeguards measurements; and (2) the unavailability of 
the copper canisters for measurement and evaluation of 
C/S once they have been loaded into transport casks. 
While also taking into consideration that ongoing daily 
operations over a period of several decades is expected 
at both facilities, there is apparent justification to develop 
very robust techniques for unattended verification and 
monitoring involving remote data transition capabilities.
For the proposed Swedish system, it appears imperative 
that the transport casks containing the canisters are 
covered by robust C/S measures from the time of canister 
loading at the encapsulation plant up to the time of entering 
the underground areas of the geological repository. It is 
considered undesirable to have routine inspection activities 
(including C/S activities) conducted underground.
Lastly, due to safety requirements, the operator is expected 
to perform comprehensive measurements on all individual 
fuel elements. These measurement results, in addition to 
equipment, may also be used by the IAEA. Consequently, 
authentication and sharing issues may need to be addressed.
Keywords: Final disposal; spent nuclear fuel; safeguards.
1. Introduction
Spent nuclear fuel from reactors must be managed and dis­
posed of in a safe manner, including safeguards. A Swedish 
system for handling spent nuclear fuel has been developed 
and proposed by the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste 
Management Company (SKB). In brief, the system is based 
on encapsulating the spent fuel in copper canisters and de­
positing them in granite bedrock about 500 m  below 
ground. In 2011 SKB formally submitted licence applications 
for an encapsulation plant and a final repository.1
Spent fuel from Swedish reactors is shipped to Clab, an in­
terim storage facility located in Oskarshamn. Here, the 
spent fuel is placed in storage pools in the bedrock about 
30 m underground. Clab has been in operation since 1985 
and is used to store spent fuel from all the nuclear power 
plants in Sweden.2 Today there are about 33,000 spent fuel 
assemblies, at Clab corresponding to 6,500 tonnes of ura­
nium and 61 tonnes of plutonium.3 . The spent fuel stored at 
Clab consists primarily of BWR and PWR fuel with a few ad­
ditions of older experimental fuel and spent fuel debris.4 The 
flow of spent nuclear fuel in Sweden is illustrated schemati­
cally by Figure 1. A proposed encapsulation plant and a ge­
ological repository are also included in the figure.
1 SKB’s licence applications under two separate legal instruments 
have been reviewed by the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority 
and by the Land and Environmental Court. The Swedish Radiation 
Safety Authority supports licensing under the Act on Nuclear Ac­
tivities on condition that a step­wise authorisation process is fol­
lowed for key future phases of development. The conclusion from 
the Land and Environment Court is that some identified uncertain­
ties in the long term stability of the copper canisters need to be 
further addressed by SKB before a licence under the Environmen­
tal Code can be considered. It is the Swedish government that 
takes the final decision.
2 The NPPs at Forsmark, Oskarshamn, Ringhals and Barsebäck 
(the latter undergoing decommissioning).
3 As of March 2017.
4 This is fuel from the closed, experimental Ågesta reactor and 
some German fuel obtained in a swap with Swedish fuel that was 
intended to be reprocessed. The fuel debris consists of parts of 
spent fuel rods from the Studsvik Hot Cell laboratory. This is debris 
from examination of the fuel or leaking fuel rods that have been cut 
in smaller parts. The fuel debris is stored in closed containers.
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Figure 1. Schematic illustration of the flow of spent fuel in Sweden, from nuclear power plants to final deposition. Source: SKB and LAJ 
Illustration.
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2. The encapsulation plant
SKB has applied for permission to build the encapsulation 
plant, which is to be co­located with the existing interim 
storage facility Clab as an extension above ground. Thus 
there will be no need for transports between the interim 
storage and the encapsulation plant. The combined facility 
will be named ‘Clink’.5 Cooling times of the spent fuel that 
will be encapsulated will typically be 40 years, but it may 
vary from 10 to 60 years. Burn­up will range from a few 
GWh/tU up to 60 GWh/tU.
Fuel to be encapsulated will be moved to a measuring po­
sition where the operator will verify important parameters 
of the fuel, such as thermal residual power and burn­up. 
After the operator’s verification, the fuel will be moved to 
a transfer canister, which will be moved to the handling cell 
where the assemblies will be dried and placed in a copper 
canister. In a series of steps, a copper lid will be put on 
and stir welded to the copper canister. The weld will be 
quality checked by the operator and the surface of the 
canister will be polished and decontaminated. Lastly, the 
canister will be placed in a transport cask and temporarily 
stored at the facility before being shipped to the geological 
repository site.
Each copper canister will have an insert of cast iron with 
positions for 12 BWR fuel assemblies or four PWR fuel as­
semblies. Fuel will be encapsulated during campaigns ar­
ranged separately for BWR and PWR fuel. It is envisaged 
that 150 canisters will be treated per year. During routine 
operation, this means loading one canister per workday, 
corresponding to a flow of 12 BWR assemblies, or four 
PWR assemblies, per day.
3. The geological repository
The plan is to build the geological repository at Forsmark, 
about 360 km north of the encapsulation plant. The repos­
itory will be close to, though separated from, the Forsmark 
NPP and the final storage facility for low and intermediate 
level radioactive waste, SFR, located there.
The geological repository will consist of a surface area and 
an underground deposition part, about 500 m  below 
ground. The surface area will encompass a terminal and 
buildings for elevators, ventilation and backfill materials. 
There will be a transport ramp for vehicles connecting the 
above ground area with the underground repository; this 
will include the vehicle for transporting the transport casks 
containing the copper canisters. Copper canisters from 
the transport vehicle will be reloaded to a deposition ma­
chine in the underground Central Area. Transport tunnels 
will lead from the Central Area to the deposition tunnels, 
5 An acronym for the Swedish term Clab and inkapslingsanläggn-
ing (Swedish for encapsulation).
each having about 30 drilled vertical holes for one copper 
canister each. When all positions in a deposition tunnel 
have been filled, the tunnel will be backfilled and sealed 
with a concrete plug. A schematic illustration of the geo­
logical repository site is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2. A  schematic illustration of the geological repository’s 
proposed layout.
Deposition tunnels will be excavated in a rock excavation 
zone, separated from the deposition and backfilling zones 
by a protection zone (with no blasting) and a separation 
wall. Excavation, deposition and backfilling can thus take 
place simultaneously, although physically separated. When 
the deposition tunnels have been backfilled, the separation 
wall will be moved, and the next step of excavation, depo­
sition and backfilling can begin. One such step will take at 
least one year.
A specially designed ship will deliver transport casks con­
taining filled copper canisters from the encapsulation plant 
to the geological repository. The transport casks will be 
temporarily stored at surface level in a terminal building be­
fore being transported by a ramp vehicle underground to 
the Central Area. The copper canisters will then be trans­
ferred from the transport cask into a radiation shield of the 
deposition vehicle. The deposition vehicle will bring the cop­
per canister from the Central Area to its final deposition po­
sition. Lastly, the ramp vehicle will return to the surface with 
the empty transport cask. The facility will deposit 150 canis­
ters per year during normal operation. This means an aver­
age of one transport cask with copper canisters will be 
transported each workday from the surface terminal build­
ing to the subsurface Central Area and deposited.
Both the encapsulation plant and the geological repository 
will be in operation for about 45 years. After this period of 
operations, the surface buildings will be removed and the 
repository sealed. More details on the proposed encapsula­
tion plant and the geological repository can be found in [1].
4. Legal requirements and national policy
One basic national legal requirement is that operators of 
nuclear facilities are responsible for ensuring that all the 
necessary measures are taken for safe management and 
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disposal of spent nuclear fuel. This includes fulfilling all obli­
gations as prescribed by Sweden’s agreements aimed at 
preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons [2]. As the 
licensees have assigned management and disposal of 
spent fuel to the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Manage­
ment Company, SKB, the responsibility rests with SKB.
Insofar as a geological repository is concerned, the main 
national policy in Sweden with regard to nuclear material 
accountancy is to provide assurance domestically and in­
ternationally that all deposited nuclear fuel is as declared. 
According to national regulations [3], SKB must ensure 
that sufficient and correct nuclear material accountancy 
information and knowledge are in place and available on 
the part of the spent fuel prior to its deposition. This can 
be carried out by verifying that the documentation accom­
panying the nuclear material is complete and correct, for 
example by using a specially designed “paper trail” (e.g., 
source and operating documents) verification procedure 
covering the entire fuel history. In the event of uncertainty, 
SKB should perform the necessary measurements or 
analyses. SKB is also required to have a system in place 
guaranteeing that necessary and correct information 
about the nuclear material is documented and retained fol­
lowing the material’s disposal.
As a consequence of Sweden’s international safeguards 
obligations, all requirements must be met as effectively 
and efficiently as possible. This should involve the inclu­
sion of design features that further facilitate the implemen­
tation of international safeguards. In order to achieve this, 
early discussions between the parties involved will be nec­
essary. Therefore, early provision of the required docu­
mentation is of importance for fostering efficient and cost­
effective safeguards.
5. Safeguards models
The IAEA model integrated safeguards approach for an 
encapsulation plant [4] assumes that the encapsulation 
plant is a separate facility and that the spent fuel will be 
transferred from an interim storage facility in a transporta­
tion cask to an assembly handling cell of the encapsulation 
facility. The proposed Swedish encapsulation plant will, 
however, be co­located with the spent fuel interim storage 
facility and form a combined facility. The encapsulation 
part of the facility will not have an area for receiving and 
storing spent fuel transport casks. The spent fuel from the 
NPPs will be stored in the interim storage area and stored 
in pools for several years before being moved internally to 
the encapsulation plant.
The IAEA model integrated safeguards approach for a ge­
ological repository [5] assumes a separate facility similar to 
the proposed Swedish system. However, there are a few 
differences. The IAEA model assumes that the copper 
canister can be identified upon receipt at the geological 
repository and that canister identif ication can be 
performed when a canister is transferred between the 
above ground area and the geological repository at the en­
trance of the repository. In the proposed Swedish system, 
however, the copper canisters will be shielded by a trans­
port cask until they reach the underground central area.
These models [4], [5] assumes that during temporary can­
ister storage above ground, dual C/S systems should be 
applied. A redundant C/S system is to be applied to the 
disposal canister during transport from the encapsulation 
plant to the repository [5]. In this context, we want to stress 
the importance of having robust C/S systems on the trans­
port cask, e.g., systems that can be fully operated by facil­
ity employees while also providing credible assurance for 
the international community.
However, these model approaches are partly outdated 
and do not fully reflect the current (not yet finally formulat­
ed) policy of the IAEA, the findings of SAGOR I­II or the 
provisions of the Additional Protocol. They can therefore 
not be used directly as a basis for any detailed technical 
preparations by Sweden.
6. Safeguards considerations
6.1 General
On the basis of, inter alia, IAEA GOV/2002/8 [6], IAEA Mod­
el Integrated Safeguards Approaches for Spent Fuel En­
capsulation Plants [4] and the IAEA Safeguards Glossary 
(2001) [7], in the absence of finally issued formulated guid­
ance, it is our understanding that the basic international 
verification requirements for an encapsulation plant are:
• Yearly verification for “gross defects” (yes/no test wheth­
er or not all declared fissile material is missing) with “low 
detection probability” (20%) for spent fuel elements 
which are available for measurement and which are “dif­
ficult to dismantle”; [4]
• Verification for “partial defects” (at least a yes/no test 
whether or not 50% of the declared fissile material 
is missing) for each spent fuel element which is being 
placed in a copper canister and for yearly verification of 
spent fuel elements which are available for measurement 
and which are not “difficult to dismantle”; [4]
• Maintaining “dual C/S” or an equivalent system for spent 
fuel elements which are not available for measurement. [4]
There is no completely clear definition of the concept “diffi­
cult to dismantle”. Rod exchange has been performed ear­
lier on both BWR and PWR fuel in the ponds of Swedish 
nuclear power plants. However, with the absence of the 
required equipment for dismantlement at the Clab and 
Clink sites, it is reasonable to assume that all fuel that will 
be deposited can be classified as “difficult to dismantle”.
With the above requirements and assumption, it is expect­
ed that the nuclear material at Clink will be verified with low 
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detection probability for gross defects on an annual basis. 
Spent fuel will be verified for partial defects immediately 
prior to encapsulation. After encapsulation, canisters will 
be placed in transport casts and temporarily stored at the 
site under dual C/S before shipment.
Thereafter a robust C/S system should be applied to the 
transport cask. This C/S should be evaluated upon entry 
into the underground area at the geological repository.
The activities under the Additional Protocol are not fully 
credited for in the two IAEA approaches mentioned above. 
The confirmed state­wide absence of undeclared activities 
should render unnecessary certain proposed monitoring 
and verification activities. In this context, we would refer to 
an excerpt from the Minutes of the Experts’ Group on 
Safeguards for Final Disposal of Spent Fuel in Geological 
Repositories [8] and also the statement from DG to the 
IAEA Board of Governors in February 2002 [9].
“The important difference is that under Integrated Safe-
guards, geophysical methods may not be needed to detect 
excavations or excavation activities. For this purpose, geo-
physical tools could be replaced with Complementary Ac-
cess and information analysis. Ground Penetrating Radar 
(GPR) may still be required for DIV purposes (i.e. detection 
of undeclared tunnels, rooms and boreholes, such as any 
permanent underground equipment and installations).” [8]
“The measures of the Model Additional Protocol were never 
intended to be simply superimposed as a new ‘layer’ of ac-
tivity on top of safeguards as implemented under INF-
CIRC/153 (Corrected) and earlier strengthening measures. 
Given the additional assurances provided under an addi-
tional protocol, the need to avoid undue burden on States 
and facility operators, and the need for maximum efficiency 
in the light of the prevailing resource constraints, the new 
measures were to be ‘integrated’ with existing ones.” [9]
Periodic DIVs and CAs under and above ground will pro­
vide sufficient assurance of the integrity of the site declara­
tions and the absence of undeclared activities for both ar­
eas. The implementation of AP measures in the State will 
add more information on the nuclear capabilities.
As mentioned earlier, the last verification opportunities for 
the individual fuel elements exist at the encapsulation 
plant. The operator is expected to perform comprehensive 
measurements on all individual fuel elements for safety 
purposes. The optimal position for the operator’s perfor­
mance of these measurements is as early as possible in 
the material flow into the encapsulation process. This ena­
bles the operator to more easily reject assemblies that for 
safety or other reasons do not fit into the planned canister.
The IAEA (and the Euratom), on the other hand, presuma­
bly prefer to have the verification measurement performed 
immediately prior to the canister lid being put on and 
welding being started. This verification is expected to be 
performed according to established IAEA criteria and 
practice, namely, a verification for “partial defects” for the 
spent fuel element.
Routine inspection activities underground at the final re­
pository are not foreseen; underground activities will be 
limited to DIV only. Also, see the following recommenda­
tion from SAGOR:
“The recommended safeguards approach is to use item 
accounting supported by a reliable and comprehensive 
C/S system above-ground to verify, inter alia, the flow of 
full casks and overpacks. DIV is recommended as the pri-
mary safeguards measure underground. DIV would in-
clude geophysical methods.”[10]
6.2  Measurements and possible use of operators’ 
results
It is not desirable to have two completely different pieces of 
measurement equipment and perhaps also two different 
measurement positions for the required final verification of 
the spent fuel. This takes up space and will take more time. 
Also, it must be kept in mind that up to 12 assemblies will 
be encapsulated on a daily basis. It should be investigated 
to what extent the operators’ measurement results and 
equipment can be shared with the IAEA (and Euratom). It 
has to be assured that the operator’s measurement results 
in principle are sufficient for the IAEA (and Euratom). There­
fore, the authentication issues must also be addressed to 
provide the international safeguards with the required op­
portunities for drawing independent conclusions.
Considering the fact that daily operations are expected to 
take place over the course of several decades, there ap­
pears to be a need to develop unattended verification 
techniques by means of remote data transmission capabil­
ities. The measurement position needs to be arranged at 
Clink in coordination with the IAEA (and Euratom).
After measurement at the Clink site, proper C/S measures 
must be applied to assure Continuity of Knowledge (CoK) 
from the final measurements until the closure of the cop­
per canister. If needed, as a backup to the C/S measures, 
a simple unattended quality control immediately prior to 
the assemblies being placed in the copper canister may 
also be considered. Such verification could involve reading 
the fuel identification number, measuring the weight of the 
assembly, and using a gross gamma detector. After the 
spent fuel has been placed in the copper canister, addi­
tional C/S measures have to be applied until the canister is 
placed in its final position in the geological repository.
If a method is developed and approved, verification of the 
copper canister may also be conducted at the encapsula­
tion plant. However, for practical reasons, there are limita­
tions to conducting similar verification on the transport 
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cask or on the copper canister underground at the final re­
pository during normal operations. In exceptional cases, 
such verification underground could be performed in order 
to resolve anomalies.
6.3 Continuity of Knowledge
In the proposed Swedish system, it seems imperative that 
the transport casks containing the canisters are covered 
by robust C/S measures from canister loading at the en­
capsulation plant to entering the underground part of the 
geological repository.
The operational activities are expected to be run continu­
ously for approximately 40­50 years with daily production 
of one copper canister and shipments on at least a bi­
weekly basis, a sealing system that can be attached, also 
that the same seal can be detached by the operator, 
would be cost­efficient and enhance an efficient use of 
resources.
The inner walls of the underground tunnels and shafts de­
fine the primary containment of the geological repository. 
During construction and operation of the repository, there 
will be an access ramp, ventilation shaft, etc. These should 
be covered by C/S methods that are able to detect move­
ments of spent fuel down to the deposition location and to 
detect any removal of nuclear material from the under­
ground part. It is important to verify that a canister enters 
the underground part of the repository. This enables us to 
treat the underground part of the geological repository as 
a black box and there is thus no need for C/S and verifica­
tion methods underground.
Also, as already discussed earlier, it is not considered de­
sirable to have routine inspections of nuclear material ac­
countancy activities, or verification of seals, etc. performed 
underground.
If the C/S is lost, specific measures determined by the 
IAEA will be applied [5]. A unique identifier for each copper 
canister resolution may contribute to its resolution, but not 
for routine use. Gamma and neutron measurements on 
the transport container may also be considered as 
a measure to resolve inconsistencies and re­establish C/S.
Verification of empty transport containers leaving the un­
derground area is to be performed, e.g., weighing, gamma 
and neutron measurement.
6.4 Design Information Verification
The integrity of the geological repository can be verified 
during DIV, which may be conducted periodically. The 
main objectives are to confirm the following: that the exca­
vations are performed as declared, that there are no other 
undeclared nuclear activities, and that there are no clan­
destine removal routes or excavations. In this context, 
Complementary Access both above and below ground, 
information from satellite imagery and other open sources’ 
information provide assurance for confirming the absence 
of clandestine activities at the area of the site. Hence, there 
is no need to continuously monitor the excavation by using 
geo­seismic monitoring.
7. Conclusions
The conclusions drawn under the Additional Protocol are 
not properly credited for in the IAEA approaches men­
tioned above. The confirmed state­wide absence of unde­
clared activities should render unnecessary certain moni­
toring and verification activities that have been proposed. 
Therefore, in this context, some of the facility­specific con­
siderations in the IAEA model may not apply.
The last verification opportunities for individual fuel ele­
ments and also for routine verification of the canisters will 
exist at the encapsulation plant. The final spent fuel verifi­
cation prior to canister welding at the encapsulation plant 
is expected to be performed according to established 
IAEA criteria and practice.
The maximum time available for verification will depend on 
the material flow. In the proposed Swedish spent fuel dis­
posal system, up to 12 assemblies will be encapsulated in 
one day, so the measurement times will probably be in the 
order of minutes. Considering the fact that daily operations 
over the course of several decades are expected, there is 
a need to develop unattended verification techniques by 
means of remote data transition transmission capabilities.
Due to safety requirements the operator is expected to 
perform comprehensive measurements on all individual 
fuel elements. It should be investigated if these measure­
ment results can be shared with the IAEA. Therefore, au­
thentication and sharing issues have to be addressed.
Inspections for DIV purposes are essential to confirm that 
the repository is constructed as declared and to confirm 
the absence of any undeclared activities. It is considered 
undesirable to have other routine and verification activities, 
including C/S, performed underground.
In the proposed Swedish spent fuel disposal system, it 
seems imperative that the transport casks containing the 
canisters are covered by robust C/S measures from the 
time of canister loading at the encapsulation plant up to 
the time of entering the underground part of the geological 
repository. It is considered undesirable to have routine in­
spection activities (including C/S activities) performed 
underground.
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Abstract:
The two Euratom On-Site Laboratories located at the re-
processing plants in Sellafield, UK (the OSL) and La 
Hague, France (the LSS) have been operational for more 
than 15 years. Both On-Site Laboratories, operated by DG 
JRC on behalf of DG ENER, are instrumental in providing 
independent assurance to the European Commission that 
nuclear material is not diverted from its declared use.
Over the years, the laboratories have been in constant evolu-
tion, some equipment became outdated and in need of refur-
bishment or replacement. Renewals in the laboratories are 
foreseen to continue over the coming years. The larger pro-
jects entailed replacement of a thermal ionization mass spec-
trometer, including decommissioning of its connected glove 
boxes and installation of a new glove box; renewal of the 
complete Hybrid K-edge analysis system, including installa-
tion of an independent gamma station and refurbishment of 
two glove boxes. Such tasks include the design, manufac-
ture, purchase, installation and testing of the required equip-
ment both at JRC-Karlsruhe and on site, as well as comply-
ing with site procedures and detailed requirements to obtain 
the operator’s permission prior to any non-routine work.
Over the years, several items of innovative equipment were 
developed at JRC-Karlsruhe, all tailored to the specific 
needs of the On-Site Laboratories and taking into account 
the operational boundary conditions of industrial nuclear 
facilities. Examples include infra-red based heater for alpha 
spectrometry with enhanced safety features; a hotplate 
using a flexible low power heating element; and a semi-au-
tomatic chemical separation unit. The replacement of cer-
tain equipment parts (e.g. LEMO connections on glove 
boxes) also required ingenious solutions.
Keywords: Safeguards; refurbishment; equipment; On­
Site Laboratories
1. Introduction
In the European Union, irradiated fuel from nuclear power 
reactors is reprocessed at La Hague in France and Sella­
field in the United Kingdom. The four reprocessing plants 
in these two sites are the largest nuclear facilities within 
the EU, processing hundreds of tons of nuclear material in 
a  year. Under the Euratom Treaty, celebrating its 60th 
anniversary in 2017, the European Commission has the 
duty to assure that nuclear material is only used for de­
clared purposes. The Commission, represented by the Di­
rectorate General for Energy (DG ENER), assures itself that 
the terms of Article 77 of Chapter VII of the Treaty have 
been complied with. In contrast to the Non­Proliferation 
Treaty, the Euratom Treaty requires the European Commis­
sion to safeguard all civil nuclear material in all EU member 
states – including the nuclear weapons states.
The considerable amount of fissile material separated per 
year (including several tonnes of Pu) calls for a stringent 
system of safeguards measures. The aim of Euratom safe­
guards is to deter diversion of nuclear material from peace­
ful use by maximising the chance of early detection. At 
a broader level, it provides assurance to the international 
community that the European nuclear industry, the EU 
member states and the European Union honour their legal 
duties under the Euratom Treaty and their commitments to 
the Non­Proliferation Treaty.
A thorough analysis of the options to perform nuclear ma­
terial accountancy and safeguard nuclear material at these 
reprocessing plants concluded – in the early 1990s – that 
sampling of material from the process streams would be 
required. Transport of the samples to a central Euratom 
laboratory should be avoided for reasons of cost effective­
ness, timeliness and risk reduction [1]. Therefore, laborato­
ries were established on the sites of Sellafield and La 
Hague that opened in 1999 and 2000, respectively.
The major advantages of On­Site Laboratories are: inspec­
tors receive sample results quickly (timeliness); in case of 
doubt re­verifications can be done with little delay; meas­
ures to make sure samples are authentic are simpler to im­
plement; efficiency and cost effectiveness; waste reduc­
tion through return of material to the process stream; and 
reduced transport needs.
2.  The Euratom Safeguards On-Site 
Laboratories [2]
In October 1999, DG ENER, the JRC, and the plant opera­
tor started up the first “On­Site Laboratory” (OSL) at the site 
of the reprocessing plants in Sellafield, to cover principally 
the activities of the newly constructed THORP plant togeth­
er with several additional samples from the older Magnox 
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plant [3]. The OSL was planned with additional capacity to 
accommodate samples from the fuel fabrication plants in 
the UK (Sellafield MOX Plant, then under construction, and 
the LEU plant at Springfields). In June 2000, the second 
On­Site Laboratory, the “Laboratoire­Sur­Site” (LSS) began 
operations at the reprocessing site in La Hague [4].
The official start of operations took place after a process 
of conception, planning, design, development, and con­
struction which lasted about one decade. Analysts of 
JRC­Karlsruhe have since been operating both On­Site 
Laboratories on behalf of Euratom Safeguards. Both On­
Site Laboratories were integrated into existing or new op­
erator laboratories. The On­Site Laboratories are run under 
the operator’s site licence and can use supporting servic­
es. They have to follow all the site safety, operating, and 
security rules. Staff of the On­Site Laboratories must be 
trained and certified under the existing site regulations and 
must comply with the same rules as the operator’s staff.
Analysts of JRC­Karlsruhe are present on­site, ensuring 
a continuous flow of samples and results. The laboratories 
receive samples from all the plants on the respective sites, 
with dissolved spent fuel, plutonium products – including 
mixed oxide fuel – and inventory samples being the most 
important types of material from an accountancy view­
point. Since the start of the On­Site Laboratories almost 
15000 samples were received. The obtained analytical 
data are used by DG ENER for direct comparison with the 
operator’s declarations and allow the evaluation of the ma­
terial flows and balance in a timely manner.
2.1 Methodology
As the nominal output of Pu can reach the order of a few 
tonnes per year for the larger reprocessing plants, safe­
guards inspectors require high­accuracy measurements in 
order to provide assurance of the absence of diversion. 
Sample measurement methods were selected using the 
criteria of highest possible measurement accuracy [2] and 
a minimum of resource consumption. Most of the samples 
are analysed by radiometric methods: K­Edge Densitome­
try (KED) for plutonium or uranium concentration; X­Ray 
Fluorescence (XRF) for the uranium/plutonium ratio; and 
High Resolution Gamma Spectrometry (HGRS) for the 
analysis of individual uranium and plutonium isotopes. The 
techniques of KED and XRF may be employed in combina­
tion in what is called Hybrid K­edge (HKED).
In order to determine the U/Pu amount content in absolute 
terms, the radiometric X­ray techniques must be calibrated 
against a standard which is traceable to the SI unit. Isotope 
Dilution Mass Spectrometry (IDMS) was chosen as the pri­
mary technique, and also serves for quality control of the ra­
diometric methods due to its superior accuracy. IDMS is 
more labour intensive and is therefore typically carried out 
only on a subset of about 10 % of the samples and allows 
measurement of both the uranium and plutonium 
concentrations and the respective isotopic compositions. 
Thermal Ionisation Mass Spectrometry (TIMS) is used for 
analysis of individual uranium and plutonium isotopes.
Quality assurance measures – both internal and external 
quality control – are of particular importance for accountan­
cy measurements at facilities with a large throughput of nu­
clear material. The work at the On­Site Laboratories is per­
formed according to quality management principles and 
follows the requirements of an ISO 17025 accredited labora­
tory. Analytical methods and procedures are whenever pos­
sible being improved and the laboratories are benchmarked 
through regular participation to inter­laboratory comparison 
exercises, such as EQRAIN (organised by CETAMA, France) 
and REIMEP (organised by JRC­Geel, Belgium). The On­
Site Laboratories aim to conform to the latest international 
standards and achieve these in daily operation.
2.2 Laboratory infrastructure and analytical capacity
The On­Site Laboratories were designed with sufficient 
capacity, both in terms of instruments and staff, to analyse 
a certain number of samples. This number relates to the 
reprocessing capacity of the plants, to nuclear material ac­
countancy regulations, the safeguards verification require­
ments, the material parameters to be measured, and the 
capacity of the different analytical methods. The analytical 
facilities are operated for about 45 weeks a year by typi­
cally 2­4 analysts a week. During operation, a minimum of 
two analysts must be present in the On­Site Laboratories 
according to safety­at­work rules.
The type of samples the On­Site Laboratories would re­
ceive was also identified during the conception phase. The 
newer reprocessing plants, such as UP3 and UP2­800 at 
La Hague and THORP at Sellafield, have different sample­
taking regimes than the older Magnox plant. The sample 
types foreseen to be analysed dictated the layout and in­
frastructure of the individual laboratories.
2.2.1 The OSL laboratory at Sellafield
The OSL Sellafield receives samples both from the front­
end but mainly from the back­end of the reprocessing cy­
cle. The radioactivity levels are such that samples can be 
manipulated in the laboratory’s glove boxes. The sample 
types are diverse and most of them require labour­inten­
sive sample preparation steps. The OSL is located in 
a building which is part of Sellafield’s Analytical Services. It 
comprises two ‘active’ laboratories, one ‘cold’ laboratory 
and an office space. All work with radioactive substances 
is performed in the two ‘active’ laboratories in glove boxes. 
There are 10 glove boxes of which the key boxes are:
• The “non­destructive analysis” glove box, where initial 
processing, analysis and sample preparation operations 
are carried out on product materials. Nearly all sam­
ples are analysed in this box. The glove box contains an 
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analytical balance, a microwave oven (for dissolutions), 
a densitometer and the equipment to perform radiomet­
ric analytical measurements (HKED, XRF, HRGS).
• A glove box dedicated to preparation of reference mate­
rials for mass spectrometry and for quantitative dilution 
of samples. The box is equipped with a bagless trans­
port system to transfer material to the chemical separa­
tion boxes that are also equipped with this system.
• Each laboratory houses a chain of glove boxes for mass 
spectrometry. The chain consists of a box used for 
chemical separation of uranium and plutonium from fis­
sion products and other actinides and for alpha spec­
trometry, and the glove boxes for preparing the mass 
spectrometer's sample holder. The mass spectrome­
ter is connected to the sample preparation box so that 
the prepared aliquots can be introduced directly into the 
mass spectrometer.
Samples taken at the front­end of the reprocessing plants 
– at the Head End Accountancy Tanks –, so called ‘Input 
samples’, are spiked in the Sellafield Thorp High Active hot 
cells. Only fractions sufficiently diluted to radiation levels 
acceptable for processing in a glove box are sent over to 
the OSL for chemical separation and mass spectrometry.
2.2.2 The LSS laboratory at La Hague
The majority of the samples received in the LSS La Hague 
are highly active input liquor samples. The LSS is located 
in an annex building to the UP3 plant. It houses three ac­
tive laboratories and an office.
• The “product laboratory” is equipped with a glove box 
for preparation of uranyl­nitrate samples for K­edge and 
mass spectrometry measurement, and to prepare mass 
spectrometry reference solutions. The laboratory further 
hosts a suite of five boxes partly equipped with master­
slave manipulators, and is dedicated to the measure­
ment of isotopic compositions of PuO2 product samples. 
Samples are received directly into the box by pneumat­
ic transfer. The suite is connected to a gamma detector, 
and houses a hotplate and balance for dissolution and 
dilution of samples prior to TIMS measurement.
• The “hot cell facilities”: The very high beta­gamma activi­
ties of input solutions and some product samples require 
the use of well­shielded hot cells equipped with master­
slave manipulators. Because of the large number of input 
samples of different origin, and to avoid cross contamina­
tion, the hot cell suite consists of three interconnected hot 
cells which are all equipped with HKED spectrometers, bal­
ances and density measurement devices. The hot cells are 
connected to the plant’s pneumatic transfer for automated 
sample receipt and to a liquid waste tank for the disposal 
of measured sample material. A small glove box is available 
for storage and treatment of reference materials.
• The “IDMS laboratory” consists of a suite of four glove 
boxes. The chain consists of a box for reception of 
diluted samples from all other LSS facilities by pneumat­
ic transfer, a box used for chemical separation of urani­
um and plutonium and for alpha spectrometry, a box for 
the assembly of the mass spectrometer's sample hold­
er, and a box that allows the introduction of the sample 
holder into the mass spectrometer.
3. Methodology changes in the early years
The Euratom On­Site Laboratories have been operated 
successfully since their start­up. Naturally, there were 
a number of unexpected difficulties to which the laborato­
ries had to adapt. Whenever necessary, methods and pro­
cedures were changed in order to improve quality of re­
sults and/or overall efficiency.
3.1 Reference Materials
Analytical methods need certified reference materials 
(CRM) traceable to the international standard (the mole) for 
(their) calibration. The chemical method installed in the On­
Site Laboratories, the isotope dilution (ID) method coupled 
with TIMS, needs the addition of a "spike" for quantitative 
analysis since the signal intensity in TIMS is not propor­
tional to the sample amount. A spike is an exactly known 
amount of target element with a different isotopic enrich­
ment in one or more isotopes.
The original plan was to prepare various suitable CRMs 
and spike solutions in the JRC­Geel, Belgium and JRC­
Karlsruhe for shipment to the On­site laboratories. Due to 
long delays in the organisation and delivery of the radioac­
tive materials and most importantly due to the instability of 
especially plutonium solutions this soon turned out to be 
highly inefficient. The On­Site Laboratories had to revert to 
varied alternatives such as preparation on­site from solid 
primary material standard and spike solutions. Again, long 
term stability of such solutions together with the increased 
workload led the On­Site Laboratories to exclusively use 
the JRC­Geel large­sized dried spike (IRMM 1027 series – 
LSD) for traceability to the mole both for the verification of 
reference solutions (prepared from actual sample material) 
and as spike for isotope dilution. The quality and reliability 
of these LSDs determine the accuracy to which the labora­
tories can operate.
3.2 Analytical method changes
3.2.1 Separation chemistry in the OSL Sellafield
A fundamental step of the sample preparation for alpha 
spectrometry and mass spectrometry analyses is the sep­
aration of uranium and plutonium fractions from fission 
products and minor actinides in the various sample types. 
A fully automatic system, developed by JRC­Karlsruhe, 
based on a Zymark robot, was originally installed in both 
On­Site laboratories. The separation method implemented 
in the OSL Sellafield was based on the PUREX process, 
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a liquid­liquid extraction method. By the time the LSS La 
Hague was constructed, a robotised method using chro­
matographic separation on resin (UTEVA®: Eichrom) had 
been developed [5]. The main advantage of the chromato­
graphic separation method is a better recovery of U and 
Pu, meaning a smaller quantity of sample is needed, and 
no ozone­depleting reagents are used.
When the lifetime of the robot installed in the OSL came to 
an end, the OSL abandoned the PUREX process in favour 
of the UTEVA® chromatography.
3.2.2 Additional pre-separation chemistry in 
the LSS La Hague
IDMS plays a key role in the On­Site Laboratories as part of 
the quality control system. Strict limitations apply to the radi­
ation level of samples allowed to be treated in glove boxes. 
An improvement which highly contributed to the quality of 
the IDMS technique involved the pre­separation of fission 
products from the input sample in the LSS hot­cell enclo­
sures. This allowed transfer of less­dilute solutions, contain­
ing higher quantities of Pu and U, allowing comfortable 
chemical separation of the two elements and simple mass 
spectrometry measurements on each fraction [6].
4. Refurbishment projects
After the On­Site Laboratories had been running without 
interruption for some 10 years, it became apparent that 
some refurbishments and renewals were due in order to 
keep the laboratories functional, and to guarantee that the 
instrumentation remains up to the latest standard allowing 
high quality measurements. A major project started in 
2010 with the replacement of a thermal ionisation mass 
spectrometer in the OSL Sellafield. Currently, a modernisa­
tion of the hybrid K­edge measurement system is ongoing 
in both On­Site laboratories, and further upgrades of mass 
spectrometers are planned for 2017­2018.
Refurbishments in the On­Site Laboratories tend to be rath­
er complex. As a result of the multilateral nature of the On­
Site Laboratories projects (DG ENER, JRC­Karlsruhe, site 
operator, and in the case of refurbishments often also 
a contractor having to work on the site to install new equip­
ment), clear agreements and contracts have to be estab­
lished. DG ENER is the owner of the laboratories and pro­
vides the necessary budgets for operations, routine 
maintenance, and refurbishments. The On­Site Laboratories 
are working under the respective Site Licences of the site 
operator and have to meet the requirements defined in 
these licences. They furthermore must comply with site 
specific safety rules, and follow site and building proce­
dures. The site operators have specific procedures to be 
followed before any non­routine work is allowed to take 
place, and permission is needed before any new equipment 
may be installed. As a result, a large amount of paperwork 
is to be completed, for review and acceptance by the site 
operator. In most cases, the site operator is involved in the 
execution of the work, as they are responsible for the provi­
sion and operation of the infrastructure. It is challenging to 
set up a sound time schedule and align the activities of all 
the stakeholders. Minor refurbishments, such as the instal­
lation of a small piece of new equipment, or a like­for­like re­
placement, are usually handled directly between the On­
Site Laboratories analysts and the relevant site operator's 
staff. For larger projects, it is necessary to set up a dedicat­
ed contract to engage a site operator's projects team.
4.1 IT Hardware replacement project
The first substantial refurbishment project done in the On­
Site Laboratories was the replacement of the IT hardware. 
The On­Site Laboratories Laboratory Information Manage­
ment System (LIMS) was developed in the 1990s in the 
JRC­Karlsruhe, and consisted of a combination of software 
modules running under the OS/2 WARP operating system. 
The original computer network was put in place during in­
stallation of the On­Site Laboratories and had been running 
for almost ten years. Modernisation had been blocked until 
the OS2 version of Windows XP became available, allowing 
an economic solution for the upgrade. The LIMS software 
packages were migrated from OS/2 WARP to a Web based 
Microsoft XP using emulation software (Virtual PC). All new 
hardware was prepared and tested in JRC­Karlsruhe and 
thereafter sent to the On­Site Laboratories for installation. In 
the OSL Sellafield, the computer renewals also required an 
upgrading of the computer cables by the site operator.
4.2 Hybrid K-edge related projects
Improvements, developments, upgrades and renewals of 
the Hybrid K­edge system have been a continuous pro­
cess since the early years of the On­Site Laboratories. Im­
provements were done to increase the efficiency of the 
laboratory and inevitably some broken equipment had to 
be replaced. Measures were taken to put a fall­back op­
tion in place to keep the OSL Sellafield operational in case 
of a fatal failure of the "non­destructive analysis" box. In 
the last couple of years preparations started for a com­
plete modernisation of the Hybrid K­edge systems.
4.2.1  Installation of an independent gamma station (OSL 
Sellafield)
Gamma spectrometry combined with Multiple Group Anal­
ysis (MGA) spectrum evaluation is a  non­destructive 
means of measuring the 238Pu/239Pu, 240Pu/239Pu and 
241Pu/239Pu isotopic ratios present in a sample and is the 
only practical means to quantify the americium/plutonium 
ratio via the 241Am/241Pu nuclide ratio. Owing to the excep­
tionally low g­activity of 242Pu, the 242Pu/239Pu ratio cannot 
be measured, but the ratio can nonetheless be estimated 
using isotope correlation data [7, 8].
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Sample throughput in the OSL Sellafield is limited by the 
"non­destructive analysis" glove box, where nearly all prod­
uct samples are analysed. Originally, also the gamma 
measurements took place in this glove box. However, gam­
ma measurements could only be carried out when the x­
ray generator of the Hybrid K­edge/XRF was switched off. 
In addition, the g­spectrometer arrangement in that glove 
box offered no means for optimisation of detector count 
rates, leading to exceptionally long counting times for MOX 
samples and to prohibitively long counting times for lower­
activity solutions (e.g. oxalate mother solutions). For a gam­
ma measurement there is actually no need to remove the 
sample from its protective packaging, and, provided that 
the samples are adequately double bagged, the samples 
can be measured outside the confinement of a glove box. 
To improve the sample throughput, to prevent an unneces­
sary shutdown of the X­ray generator and to allow all sam­
ples, including low­activity oxalate mother solutions, to be 
measured to better accuracy and with a reduced measure­
ment time, it was decided to equip the OSL Sellafield with 
an external gamma station similar to the external gamma 
stations developed and in use at the JRC­Karlsruhe.
The external gamma station was manufactured in JRC­
Karlsruhe. It consists of a high purity germanium detector, 
connected to a shielded sample cavity. The station is 
mounted on a  trolley. Pending samples are stored in 
a lockable shielded safe. The external gamma station is 
connected to the signal processing electronics traditionally 
used for the glove box based gamma measurements. The 
gamma measurements, evaluation of the spectra and re­
porting of measurements to the LIMS are therefore under 
control of the Alpha Workstation.
Figure 1. Drawing of the independent gamma station.
The use of the external gamma station in the OSL Sella­
field represents a considerable improvement for the non­
destructive analysis routine work in terms of sample 
throughput and quality of measurement and in terms of 
work organisation and flexibility. The station enables the 
whole sample to be viewed rather than a highly collimated 
portion of it; the gamma detector receives a noticeably 
higher amount of gamma rays, offers better count rate 
control and leads to quicker and more precise analysis. 
Also, the use of the external gamma station drastically im­
proves the flexibility of the analysts work planning as gam­
ma measurement can be performed in parallel to sample 
measurements involving K­edge/XRF.
4.2.2  Refurbishment of two glove boxes (OSL Sellafield)
In the OSL Sellafield nearly all product samples are pre­
pared in the "non­destructive analysis" glove box and 
measured by the equipment inside or connected to the 
glove box using radiometric techniques. The high radiation 
of the samples as well as the acids used for sample prep­
aration has caused and may continue to cause degrada­
tion of the glove box. The glove box will continue to be 
used with improvements and equipment repairs as need­
ed. However, an alternative analysis route, based on 
chemistry/mass spectrometry, has been installed as a fall­
back option in case of a major disruption in the "non­de­
structive analysis" glove box. This fall­back option was the 
subject of an "OSL glove box refurbishment project" in­
volving DG ENER, the plant operator and the OSL, and 
consisted of the refurbishment of two glove boxes:
• Conversion of a uranium glove box which was used pre­
viously for preparation and initial analysis of pure ura­
nium samples. The glove box was re­categorised as 
a uranium/plutonium box for performing second­step di­
lutions on sample aliquots to a concentration which is 
suitable for separation chemistry, and for preparation of 
reference solutions needed for the calibration of the OSL 
instrumentation.
• Conversion of the existing uranium/plutonium dilution 
glove box into a "dissolution­spiking" box. The glove box 
was refurbished to take over initial processing and sam­
ple preparation operations on all product samples: weigh­
ing, dissolution, dilution and spiking. No radiometric tech­
niques are foreseen to be performed in this glove box.
All design was made in JRC­Karlsruhe and submitted to 
the plant operator for approval. Manufacturing of the new 
equipment and materials needed was mostly done in the 
JRC­Karlsruhe workshops, and thereafter sent over to the 
OSL Sellafield for installation by the OSL analysts. One of 
the most challenging tasks was to design all materials 
such that they could be introduced in the glove box via the 
existing posting ports, e.g. a new glove box floor. Some of 
the innovative design is described further in this paper.
4.2.3  Modernisation of the Hybrid K-edge densitometry 
system
The Hybrid K­edge / X­ray Fluorescence Densitometer in­
strumentation is used by Euratom and by the IAEA for Nu­
clear Material Accountancy Measurements [9]. It is the 
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instrument of choice for Safeguards measurements at Nu­
clear Fuel Reprocessing Plants such as Sellafield, La 
Hague and Rokkasho. The instrument was developed at 
JRC­Karlsruhe, some 30 years ago and continues to play 
an important role in Nuclear Safeguards measurements.
Although most of the instrument’s original OpenVMS­based 
software is still very capable, the instrument's hardware is 
getting very old. The Alpha workstation computers, which run 
the software, and the spectroscopy electronic modules, 
which measure the K­edge and XRF spectra, are no longer 
made and must be replaced by modern equivalents. Howev­
er, a ready­to­use combination of all modules replacing the 
whole interface cannot be purchased on the market. An inno­
vative solution needed to be worked out in JRC­Karlsruhe. 
A further improvement of hardware tackled at the same time 
is the replacement of the traditional liquid nitrogen­cooled 
HRGS detectors by electrically cooled detectors.
4.2.3.1. Installation of emulated Open VMS software
The Virtual Alpha emulator is a software application in­
stalled on a PC with Microsoft Windows® 7 OS (Host sys­
tem), which emulates the functions of an Alpha worksta­
tion with OpenVMS operating system (Guest system). The 
guest system is saved as a virtual hard drive. This virtual 
hard drive is an image of a real hard drive of the VMS sys­
tem running on an Alpha workstation. The emulator soft­
ware enables the Open VMS and all the VMS software in­
stalled in the virtual hard drive to run on modern and most 
advanced PC architecture (x86 and the latest Intel Proces­
sors) with Windows® OS although designed for the Alpha 
workstation architecture. Hence this allows continued use 
of VMS specific software (i.e. Canberra k­edge software, 
Neutron Counting software etc.) on modern hardware.
The system was first set up and tested in JRC­Karlsruhe in 
collaboration with an external contractor (Migration Spe­
cialties Europe, Tarthorst, Netherlands). Meanwhile most of 
the Alpha workstations in the On­Site Laboratories have 
been replaced.
Figure 2. Virtual Alpha emulator installed on PC.
4.2.3.2. Replacement of NIM electronic modules by Lynx
The traditional Nuclear Instrumentation Modules (NIM) are 
no longer manufactured and the repair of broken NIM units 
is no longer guaranteed. The Lynx hardware produced by 
Canberra is a good alternative to traditional NIM. A software 
driver to allow Lynx to run with the Hybrid K­edge/XRF's 
OpenVMS operating system has been developed and test­
ed in JRC­Karlsruhe, so the Hybrid K­edge/XRF software is 
now capable of using modern Lynx spectroscopy hardware. 
The Lynx hardware outperforms the traditional NIM hard­
ware except for digital peak stabilization. The HKED system 
uses two peaks (22.1 and 88.04 keV), originating from 
a 109Cd­source located close to the detector, as reference 
peaks for the digital stabilisation of the electronics. Properly 
peak­stabilized spectra are a crucial requirement for reliable 
Hybrid K­edge/XRF spectrum evaluation, and it is essential 
that this problem is remedied before the Lynx hardware can 
be used to replace the aging NIM electronics. An algorithm 
to improve upon the deficient Lynx peak stabilization has 
been developed at JRC­Karlsruhe. The computational ap­
proach performs better than the Lynx peak stabilization and 
even performs better than NIM­based peak stabilization. 
Tests on the post­processing algorithm have been complet­
ed, and the algorithm now has to be integrated into the 
OpenVMS­based Hybrid K­edge/XRF software. An addi­
tional advantage is that the new algorithm will be able to 
cope better with weaker 109Cd radio­active sources.
4.2.3.3.  Replacement of the X-ray generators 
(LSS La Hague)
The LSS has 4 Hybrid K­edge densitometry systems each 
equipped with a high voltage generator of 160 kV and 
15 mA and X­ray tube control unit. The generators have 
exhibited increased breakdowns and reduced reliability. It 
is furthermore becoming more and more difficult to repair 
the instruments as spare parts are lacking. Merion – Can­
berra have indicated that future repairs cannot be guaran­
teed. New HV generators (GE Titan Isovolt) capable to de­
liver 160 kV and up to 15 mA and compatible with the 
existing X­ray tubes (Comet MIR 160/12) were ordered and 
will be installed in the near future. The replacement will en­
sure reliable operation for many years to come.
4.2.3.4. Installation of electrically-cooled detectors
Replacement of the traditional liquid nitrogen­cooled de­
tectors by electrically­cooled detectors eliminates the need 
for liquid nitrogen, which has the following advantages:
• Independence from the availability of liquid nitrogen in 
the controlled areas of the operator site
• Elimination of the risks of working with liquid nitrogen 
(frostbite, asphyxiation)
• Use of an environment­friendly alternative to liquid nitrogen
• Significant savings in running costs (labour, liquid 
nitrogen)
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In the OSL Sellafield three detectors with their associated 
25L Dewars will be replaced by three Cryo­pulse® CP­5 U­
style Ge detectors. The Canberra Cryo­Pulse® 5 Plus is an 
electrically­powered cryostat for use with HPGe radiation 
detectors. It utilizes a pulse tube cooler, a highly reliable 
technology originally used in military and space applica­
tions, which has proven its value for germanium detectors in 
the original Cryo­Pulse 5. As stated by the producer, like its 
predecessor, the Cryo­Pulse 5 Plus consists of a cold­
head­assembly, to which the detector is attached, and an 
external power controller. The basic external design and in­
terface of the cold­head have been preserved to maximize 
interchangeability between the previous and the new ver­
sion. However, the cold­head internals and the controller 
have been completely redesigned and new features have 
been added to improve the performance and reliability and 
to better answer customers’ requirements. In order to deal 
with the restricted space under the “non­destructive analy­
sis” glove box and in the external gamma station, the CP5 
have been custom built to offer a sideways­viewing detector 
head. The cryostats will be placed on metal support frames, 
manufactured in the JRC­Karlsruhe, so that the units can 
be positioned in the exact required location. The cryostats 
have been tested in the JRC­Karlsruhe prior to shipment to 
the OSL. They are ready for installation as soon as the ad­
ministrative procedure to obtain permission from the site 
operator will be finalised.
A similar replacement action is foreseen for the seven 
HPGe detectors at the LSS La Hague because two of the 
detectors cannot be repaired anymore. As space restric­
tions are not an issue, the LSS opted for the hybrid detec­
tor cooling system, a combination of an electrically­cooled 
detector with a  liquid nitrogen cryostat, the Canberra 
Cryo­cycle II. Cooling is guaranteed by the liquid nitrogen 
in case of power outages. The cryostat can do without ex­
tra nitrogen for at least 6 months. A substantial reduction 
of liquid nitrogen consumption is to be expected.
Figure 3. Cryo­pulse® CP­5 U­style Ge detectors (left) for the 
OSL and Cryo­cycle II Ge detectors (right) for the LSS.
4.2.4 Replacement of K-edge cooling
In both On­Site Laboratories, the refrigeration chillers 
which serve to cool down the X­ray tubes have been re­
placed when they became unrepairable. In the LSS La 
Hague, a preliminary infrastructure study was performed 
by the JRC­Karlsruhe, the work itself was outsourced to 
a contractor. In the OSL Sellafield, the exchange of the re­
frigeration chiller was handled by the site operator's pro­
ject team.
4.2.5 Replacement of Anton Paar densitometers
The densitometry instrumentation currently in use is the 
Anton Paar DMA 48 in conjunction with an external meas­
uring cell DMA 401. Both the DMA 48 and the DMA 401 
are equipped with a borosilicate glass U­tube. The resolu­
tion of the instrument is 0.00001 g/cm3 and the accuracy 
can be as good as 0.00005 g/cm3. The internal measuring 
tube is not used. The external measuring cell requires 
some modification before installation in the hot cells in the 
LSS and a glove box in the OSL. To maintain the tempera­
ture at 25 °C (in the LSS) or 20 °C (in the OSL) a tempera­
ture control circuit is used.
The DMA 48 and the DMA 401 are no longer available on 
the market. JRC­Karlsruhe has successfully used the 
spare internal measuring cells to manufacture external 
measuring cells. Now, there are no cells available any­
more. The densitometers currently available on the market 
are integrated within a desktop model. A modification of 
these models for use in a nuclear environment is not pos­
sible since too many important components are not resist­
ant to radiation. Anton Paar offers a new external measur­
ing cell with a hollow U­ tube made of Hastelloy C­276 
(DMA HPM) to be used in conjunction with the mPDS5 
evaluation unit. JRC­Karlsruhe is modifying and testing this 
instrument for future use in the On­Site Laboratories.
4.3 Mass spectrometry refurbishment projects
Mass spectrometry serves a twofold purpose at the On­
Site Laboratories. Thermal Ionisation Mass Spectrometry 
is used to measure the uranium and plutonium isotopic 
compositions. Isotope Dilution Mass Spectrometry is em­
ployed to determine uranium and plutonium mass fractions 
using a well­characterized reference material, for example, 
"Large­Sized Dried Spikes" (LSD) [10, 11]. The latter results 
are also used to characterise the calibration solutions for 
the HKED densitometers.
4.3.1  Decommissioning of an old TIMS MAT261 mass 
spectrometer and installation of a Triton
In 2009, a project was set up to replace a broken down 
MAT261 mass spectrometer in the OSL Sellafield, and re­
place it with a Triton (Thermo Fisher Scientific GmbH) in­
strument. It was the first major refurbishment project in the 
OSL, involving four parties (DG ENER, JRC­Karlsruhe, 
Sellafield Ltd. and Thermo Fischer). A dedicated contract 
was signed between DG ENER and the site operator for 
their Projects' team to bring the project forward and per­
form the necessary infrastructure works. The purchase of 
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the Triton was handled by JRC­Karlsruhe on behalf of DG 
ENER. Additional equipment such as a dedicated glove 
box was deve loped and manufactured in the 
JRC­Karlsruhe.
The following on­site work phases were identified:
• Disconnection of two glove boxes from the mass spec­
trometry chain and their decommissioning
• Decommissioning of the broken MAT 261 mass 
spectrometer
• Preparation of the laboratory infrastructure to accommo­
date the Triton specifications
• Installation of the new mass spectrometer
• Installation of a new glove box and connection to 
the separation chemistry box and the new mass 
spectrometer
• Commissioning and validation
With the installation of the Triton the OSL acquired a state­
of­the­art instrument for mass spectrometry. The number 
of samples that can be loaded on one magazine is signifi­
cantly higher than for the MAT261, and the instrument can 
run in independent mode, allowing overnight measure­
ments. Hence, due to the Triton the OSL managed to in­
crease the efficiency of the laboratory with delivery of high 
quality results.
Figure 4. Triton connected to glove box (left) installed in the OSL 
and photo of the inauguration (right).
4.3.2  Upgrade of the Filament Degassing Unit (OSL 
Sellafield)
The Filament Degassing Unit (FDD) is needed to degas fil­
aments before they can be used as sample holders for 
mass spectrometry. The FDD installed in the OSL Sellafield 
was a 30 years old instrument with limited capacity. Short­
ly after the installation of the Triton, the Filament Degassing 
Unit was refurbished:
• Upgrade of the electronics
• Replacement of the filament rack, the new rack contain­
ing 30 positions
Since the upgrade, the Filament Degassing Unit is more 
reliable, with the main advantage that 30 filaments can be 
baked at once, saving valuable time for the mass spec­
trometry analyst.
Figure 5. Filament rack containing 30 positions.
The FDD unit in the LSS La Hague has become faulty and 
can only work on one side, thus degassing only half of its 
capacity. It will be replaced by a new instrument in the 
near future.
4.3.3 Upgrade of three TIMS MAT26x mass spectrometers
The JRC has three TIMS MAT261 mass spectrometers oper­
ational: one in the JRC­Karlsruhe; one in the LSS La Hague; 
and one in the OSL Sellafield. Due to their different ages (from 
18 to 35 years old), the hardware/software components and 
the operation of the instruments is somewhat different. For 
the oldest instrument, located in the JRC­Karlsruhe, electron­
ic modules are becoming sparse and it has become difficult 
to purchase original spare parts. Despite its age, the instru­
ment remains important for training new analysts before they 
are allowed to work in the On Site Laboratories. Therefore it 
was decided to upgrade the three mass spectrometers. The 
company Spectromat provides commercial options for refur­
bishment of MAT26x instruments, such as the provision of 
modern electronics for operation and data acquisition, and 
some hardware components. The installation of Spectromat 
software is required for communication with the new elec­
tronic modules. Due to the different ages of the three mass 
spectrometers, the upgrades will be individually different: 
from new software only for the OSL instrument, to some 
hardware plus software upgrade for the LSS instrument; and 
of a complete exchange of electronics, some hardware and 
software in JRC­Karlsruhe.
The approach will allow the three instruments to remain in 
operation over the coming 10+ years, at a cost which is far 
lower than the purchase cost of new instruments. Moreover, 
all three mass spectrometers will be running with exactly the 
same software, which simplifies the work of the analysts.
5. Innovating developments
Over the years, the On­Site Laboratories faced specific 
problems which required creative solutions. Also in the 
framework of the extended refurbishment projects, some 
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ideas were worked out and led to many innovative devel­
opments that could be relevant for other laboratories.
5.1  Modifications to the densitometers located in hot 
cells (LSS La Hague)
To introduce a  liquid in the glass U­tube of the external 
measuring cell of the Anton Paar density meter the cell is 
equipped with a screwed­on metal tube with an external di­
ameter of 1.6 mm. It is however extremely difficult to mount 
a new tube or new flexible tubing. Although very resistant, 
the flexible tubing occasionally needs to be replaced. Also, 
the Teflon tips connected to the metal tube making contact 
with the glass cell break off after a certain time. The output 
side of the glass cell is connected to a 3­way valve via 
a similar system. A breakdown of this tube connection sys­
tem usually meant a long downtime for the density meter as 
only a very experienced analyst was able to perform the re­
pair. Since no useable alternative was available on the mar­
ket, JRC­Karlsruhe has developed a new flexible tubing 
connection system for the glass cell, and quick­snap con­
nections in stainless steel for the 3­way valve.
Figure 6. Flexible tubing connection for use with manipulators 
(left) and small stainless steel quick snap connections (right).
5.2  Infrared heater for preparation of alpha planchets
Alpha spectrometry measurements are required for all Pu 
fractions to be measured by mass spectrometry in order 
to de­convolute any possible isobaric interference from 
238U with 238Pu. The system originally installed in the On­
Site Laboratories for the preparation of alpha measure­
ment planchets (metal sample holders) was prone to fre­
quent breakdowns of its heating element. The system was 
also limited to a maximum planchet temperature of 180 
°C, and planchets had to be prepared one at a time. JRC­
Karlsruhe developed and manufactured a stand­alone 
heating unit containing a 100 W infra­red element. The unit 
includes safety features to prevent the inadvertent contact 
of the heating platform with glove box gloves or other 
combustible material. It also incorporates a timer which 
locks the unit until sufficient cooling time has elapsed be­
fore the analyst can access the heating platform. The new 
unit delivers a planchet temperature of approximately 290 
°C, which in turn prepares better quality planchets. As 
a result, almost no alpha planchets need repetition. More­
over, it is possible to prepare 4 planchets simultaneously, 
therefore reducing the overall preparation time.
Figure 7. Infrared heater for preparation of alpha planchets.
5.3 Semi-automated separation unit
A fully automated Zymark robot was originally installed in 
the On­Site Laboratories for chemical processing of the 
samples. Chemical separation is required to remove decay 
and fission products and provide separated U and Pu frac­
tions for mass spectrometry. After ten years of use, the ro­
bots came to the end of their lifetime and repeated break­
downs led to long downtimes, while it became increasingly 
difficult to obtain spare parts after the commercially availa­
ble device was withdrawn from the market. While routine 
operations continued with manual separations, a new so­
lution was needed to replace the outdated robots. The de­
vice had to be safe to operate in a glove box, and be com­
pact enough to allow posting it into the existing boxes via 
the posting ports. A semi­automated separation device for 
chromatographic separation on resin (UTEVA®: Eichrom) 
has been developed by the JRC­Karlsruhe in collaboration 
with the IAEA under the framework of the EC support pro­
gramme to the IAEA [12]. The JRC­Karlsruhe planned and 
built the unit while the IAEA developed the controlling soft­
ware based on an early version from JRC­Karlsruhe. The 
main features of the semi­automated separation unit are its 
modular construction for simple replacement of compo­
nents; minimum need for operator intervention; its light 
structure, built using materials resistant to acid environ­
ment; and its remote control function via a LabView­based 
software. The benefits of the semi­automated separation 
unit are a reduction of the radiation dose rates in the vicini­
ty of the operators and an increase in the sample through­
put. The device is expected to be installed in the LSS La 
Hague in the near future.
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Figure 8. Semi­automated separation unit.
5.4  Foil heater, a hotplate based on a flexible low 
power heating element
A hotplate, for the purpose of dissolving spiked samples or 
powders/pellets in a glove box, has been designed, manu­
factured and tested at JRC­Karlsruhe. Heat is provided 
with a flexible heating element that can be purchased from 
several manufacturers (Minco, Termya, and Synomas). The 
element is made of wires insulated in a polyimide film (Ka­
pton®). The operational voltage range employed to dis­
solve samples is between 16 V and 20 V: within this opera­
tional range the power dissipated per unit of the hotplate 
surface varies from 0.26 W/cm2 to 0.32 W/cm2. Even lower 
voltages are suitable for spike­dissolutions. The heating el­
ement is enclosed in an outer casing made of polycarbon­
ate with UL94 V­0 flammability certification. The external 
temperature on the surface of the outer casing reaches no 
more than 60 °C. Heat output and external­surface tem­
perature of the foil heater enclosure are therefore accepta­
ble for use inside a glove box. An outlet in the casing is 
connected to the ventilation system to remove acid fumes. 
The hotplate has inserts allowing secure placement of 
spike vials or various sizes of Erlenmeyer flasks. Several 
heating devices can be connected in series. The case(s) 
containing the flexible heating system and the temperature 
sensor are located in the glove box, whilst the power sup­
ply and the temperature control unit are located outside 
the glove box. The cabling is connected via feed­through 
"LEMO" connectors.
Figure 9. Foil heater for use with Erlenmeyer (left) or spike vials 
(middle) and prototype (right).
5.5  Mounting of additional lead shielding to glove 
boxes
The glove boxes installed in the OSL Sellafield are Perspex 
type boxes. The glove box window panels and ceiling con­
sist of 12 mm Perspex, and the bottom plate is made of 
stainless steel. The glove boxes are supported on a steel 
frame. During installation, those gloveboxes foreseen at 
the time to be used for more active samples were provided 
with additional 2cm thick lead glass window panels. In the 
framework of the OSL refurbishment, additional shielding 
was installed to some gloveboxes to provide increased 
protection to operators from radiation.
5.5.1  Additional shielding surrounding an existing Perspex 
type glove box
The steel framework, on which the Perspex glove box is rest­
ing, had no features foreseen to add heavy additional shield­
ing. A design was made to clamp a second support frame to 
the existing glove box support frame. The arrangement did 
not require welding or drilling. The shielding was comprised 
of half­thickness leaded­panels (in front of the Perspex side­
windows), with painted lead shielding fitted to the fourth side 
where a bagless transport system was in place.
5.5.2  Additional shielding underneath an existing glove box
Additional lead shielding was installed underneath two OSL 
Sellafield glove boxes. Lead sheets with a  thickness of 
2­3 mm (supported by a 2 mm layer of aluminium) were in­
serted under the glove box, thereby increasing the shielding 
efficiency of the glove box’s floor and protecting the lower 
half of the operator’s body from radiation uptake. The instal­
lation of the extra shielding required neither particular inter­
vention nor modification of the infrastructure. The lead 
sheets slide in between the existing glove box frame and 
existing lead window frame so that they are positioned un­
der the glove box but on the top of the glove box stand. The 
lead sheets are secured in place with steel clips and an ad­
ditional support bar. The overall weight, estimated at 55 kg, 
is well within the tolerance limit of the glove box stand.
5.6 Replacement of a glove box's flooring
In the framework of the refurbishment of a glove box in the 
OSL Sellafield, it was decided to replace the glove box 
flooring. Several pieces of equipment were removed dur­
ing the cleanout of the box, leaving the original plastic floor 
uneven. Not only would this have posed some restrictions 
in the possible layout of the refurbished box, but also the 
risk of accidental spillages would have been considerable.
5.6.1 Removal of the old flooring
The plastic floor sheet which covered 75% of the glove box 
floor had to be removed to allow the fitting of a new floor. 
JRC­Karlsruhe selected and trialled a powered cutting tool 
(Multimaster) for the cutting­up of the plastic floor sheet. Also, 
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some silicon sealant had to be removed whilst taking care 
not to damage any of the materials that form part of the glove 
box containment, such as the Perspex panels or the rubber 
sealant between the Perspex and metal frame. An aluminium 
adjustable spacer was designed and attached to the cutting 
tool, which controlled the depth of the cut with high precision. 
Tests were performed and videoed in the JRC­Karlsruhe 
workshop and submitted to the plant operator to prove the 
safety of the tool. Training was given to the analysts in the use 
of the Multimaster in a mock­up glove box in JRC­Karlsruhe 
prior to performing the work on site.
5.6.2 Installation of new polycarbonate glove box flooring
The design of the new glove box f loor was quite 
challenging:
• All materials needed had to be introduced into the glove 
box via the existing posting ports. Glove boxes in the 
OSL Sellafield have 8 inch ports, with one 16 inch port in 
the roof of the box.
• Only non­combustible or fire retardant and heat resist­
ant materials are allowed to be used throughout the fa­
cility. The plant operator required the use of a UL94 V­0 
certified material, which is difficult to obtain in Europe in 
small quantities.
• The design must allow regular inspection of the area un­
derneath the floor for spillages, as well as the possibility 
to clean up such spills
The new glove box floor is made from polycarbonate rods 
that slot together to form a frame, then levelled and cov­
ered by polycarbonate tiles. The polycarbonate used is 
Makrolon GP Clear 099 with the required UL94 V­0 certifi­
cation. Once in place, the middle tiles are removable with 
the aid of a rubber plunger. A trial assembly was carried 
out in the JRC­Karlsruhe workshop prior to the flooring 
being delivered to site.
Figure 10. New polycarbonate glove box floor.
5.7 Replacement of feed-through LEMO connectors
The feed­through LEMO connectors originally fitted to the 
glove box panels in the On­Site Laboratories were 
showing signs of corrosion and were going green in colour 
due to the material of manufacture and the glove box envi­
ronment. JRC­Karlsruhe has developed two ways of ad­
dressing the problem.
5.7.1  Installation of additional LEMO connectors via 
a glove or posting port
In JRC­Karlsruhe, additional LEMO feed­through connec­
tors are installed by sacrificing a glove or posting port. An 
unused port is closed off by a port cap containing the nec­
essary feed­through connectors. The system is also used 
for throughput of reagents tubing.
Figure 11. Posting port with LEMO feed­through connectors.
In the LSS La Hague, additional feed­through connectors 
will also be installed via a posting port. However, the 
choice fell on titanium connectors from Souriau (formally 
Jupiter) in line with the plant operator practices.
5.7.2 Exchange of feed-through LEMO connectors (OSL)
In the OSL Sellafield, feed­through LEMO connectors were 
replaced during the refurbishment of two glove boxes. 
LEMO connectors which are no longer needed have been 
covered by stainless steel caps. All other LEMO connec­
tors were replaced by stainless steel bulkhead LEMO plug/
socket connectors. In the first glove box, the contamina­
tion levels were so low that, apart from wearing gloves and 
respirator protection, no additional measures were re­
quired. The contamination level in the second glove box 
called for a more stringent method to be developed. A new 
set of tools was specially developed, along with a specific 
methodology, the application of which would limit the need 
for cleaning to “contamination­free” levels to the area 
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immediately surrounding the feed­through connector. 
Within a procedure that is the subject of a current patent 
application, the arrangement provided engineered safe­
guards to guarantee that no contamination was released 
from the glovebox during the exchange of connectors.
6. Conclusions
The Euratom On­Site Laboratories have been operated 
successfully for more than 15 years. Based on the opera­
tional experience, processes have continually been opti­
mised and procedures streamlined. After the first ten years, 
optimisation alone was no longer sufficient to keep the lab­
oratories operational in the long term. Therefore, laboratory 
refurbishment had to be looked at with an open mind for 
future needs. Renewals in the On­Site Laboratories mostly 
involve specialised and fit­for­purpose equipment that can­
not be purchased on the market without adaptations, or 
cannot be purchased at all. The analysts working in the 
On­Site Laboratories have always been dedicated to come 
up with creative, purpose­built, problem­oriented solutions. 
The JRC­Karlsruhe in­house design team and workshop 
have proved to be of utmost importance to support the 
On­Site Laboratories. This cooperation resulted in a whole 
series of innovative developments, which may be useful for 
other laboratories in the nuclear and/or other fields. Also, 
the site operators play an important role in any refurbish­
ment project. The refurbishment programs are still ongoing, 
and are foreseen to continue over the coming years. The 
On­Site Laboratories are well placed to continue to deliver 
high quality results to DG ENER.
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